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Scholars have extensively studied the return of international mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As). Yet, we know little about the risk or failure of international M&As. At the pre-
completion stage, around 20 percent of M&As get withdrawn, and risk, comparing to return, 
is a better indicator of deal failure. My dissertation essay one investigates the interplay effects 
of post-acquisition risk factors while my dissertation essay two examines the withdrawal of 
international deals through the impact of traditional institutional development and 
contemporary behavioral indicators at country level. Using asset pricing to measure shifts in 
risk and a large sample of international acquisitions by US firms during 2000-2014, essay one 
finds that acquirers can reduce their risk by trading internal and deal-level risk factors 
(information asymmetry and moral hazard) off against external and country-level risk factors 
(“liability of foreignness” and “double-layered acculturation”). Building on institutional 
theory and information asymmetry argument, essay two applies the concept of operational 
risk as the contingency of country governance quality and the likelihood of deal withdrawal. 
Operational risk provides us a contemporary measure of organizational behavior under the 
various “rules of the game”. Using panel data method and a sample of 8,008 cross-border 
deals which includes 1,744 country pairs during 1996—2016, essay two finds that acquiring 
country’s governance quality decreases the likelihood of deal withdrawal, and the risk 
mitigating effect is even stronger when the selling country has a strong governance 
mechanism as well, or when the acquiring country has high operational risk, or when the 
selling country has lower operational risk. 
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INTRODUCTION TO DISSERTATION ESSAYS 
 
Motivation of the Dissertation Essays 
The market of international mergers and acquisitions (M&As) has been particular 
active in recent decades. Scholars from various fields such as finance, accounting, 
management, and international business have studied the acquisition behavior of 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) extensively (see review studies Haleblian et al., 2009; 
Martynova & Renneboog, 2008; Shimizu et al., 2004; Tuch & O’Sullivan, 2007). However, 
prior studies have heavily focused on the post-acquisition return (such as return on equity, 
abnormal return, and integration capabilities etc.) rather than the post-acquisition risk or 
failure even though the failure rate of international M&As ranges between 45% and 67% 
(Mukherji, Dibrell, & Francis, 2013). To better understand the high failure rate, examining 
the post-acquisition risk or failure directly is essential (Lee & Caves, 1998; Park & Russo, 
1996).  
Among the extant research on cross-border M&As, a few studies stand out for 
probing the risk dimension of M&As (Chari & Chang, 2009; Reuer, Shenkar, & Ragozzino, 
2004). Building their significant development in exploiting one source of risk as 
performance-contingent payout (i.e., stock payment or earnouts) or share of equity sought, 
Essay I addresses risk more holistically and allow the risk factors to complementarily 
interplay with each other as recommended by integrated risk management perspective 
(Miller, 1992). 
The failure of M&As occurs either in the pre-completion stage or after the 
completion. Studies have shown that around 20% of the M&A announcements end up being 
withdrawn before completion (Bates & Lemmon, 2003). Deal withdrawal or deal 
abandonment incurs a large amount of costs including upfront costs in target selection and 
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professional services (Bainbridge, 1990), costs of revealing private information (Officer, 
2003), opportunity costs (Bainbridge, 1990), the cost of breaching the contract (e.g., 
termination fees) and reputational losses (He & Zhang, 2018). Despite of the substantial cost, 
many firms still abandon their initiated deal, and we know little about the reasons behind the 
phenomenon. Essay II examines the impact of a traditional country-level factor—institutional 
environment, and one contemporary country-level factor—operational risk, on the likelihood 
of international deal withdrawal.   
 
Significance of Essay I 
International M&A research concludes that the key risk factors are information asymmetry, 
moral hazard, and country-level uncertainties such as the “liability of foreignness” and 
“double-layered acculturation” (Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996; Eden & Miller, 2004). To 
understand the behaviour of cross-border M&A risk and to assess the efficacy of mitigation 
channels, we exploit the complementary and competing effects of these risk factors through 
their indicators: industry relatedness, cultural distance, and institutional distance. Using a 
sample of 1,874 international acquisitions by US firms from 2000 to 2014, we find our results 
support our theoretical proposition: strategic international risk, examined in the context of 
cross-border M&As in our study, is subject to an array of simultaneous trade-offs among the 
risks of adverse selection, moral hazard, and target-country distance. Our study provides 
three contributions.  
First, Essay I bridges a gap in the international business (IB) literature on risk as the 
performance outcome; while the literature is rich with theory and empirical evidence on the 
outcomes of internationalization strategies, it is disproportionately focused on returns. 
However, returns are just one facet of performance, which cannot illustrate the full outcomes 
of internationalization. Along with the attainment of economic rents, managing risks is a 
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primary objective of firms operating internationally (Ghoshal, 1987; Miller, 1992). By 
studying risk as the performance outcome, we open a debate to investigate, quantify, and 
mitigate strategic international risks. Second, we contribute to the theory of integrated risk 
management (Miller, 1992). The dominant theories explaining the cross-border M&A 
phenomenon are transaction cost economics (TCE), ownership-location-internalization 
(OLI), and the resource-based view (RBV). While these theories build a strong foundation 
within this body of literature, Miller’s framework provides a unique perspective on theorizing 
about cross-border M&A risk. Our study extends his integrated risk framework in the specific 
context of cross-border M&As. We posit that acquirers can leverage internal factors from 
deal-level characteristics to offset external risks coming from country-level factors. Third, we 
contribute to the cross-border M&A literature by providing a measure of risk. Despite the 
extensive research on cross-border M&As, we are not close to explaining the high failure 
rates as we tend to overlook risk (Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 
2009). Scholars have recently focused on examining abnormal returns as the performance 
measure. Abnormal returns estimate the difference between actual and expected returns, 
which assumes risk to be time-invariant across pre- and post-announcement periods. Thus, 
they fail to account for possible shifts in the volatility – hence the risk – of stock returns. 
Instead, we measure the acquirers’ post-acquisition shift in systematic risk from the 
difference between pre- and post-announcement periods, using the Carhart Four-Factor 
Model (Lubatkin & O’Neill, 1987).  
 
Significance of Essay II 
Information asymmetry is the main culprit of deal abandonment. A deal withdrawal usually 
occurs because of the release of unexpected information after the announcement (Davidson 
III, Rosentein, & Sundaram, 2002; Hotchkiss, Qian, & Song, 2005). The reasons for the 
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revealing of new information could be (1) there is a misunderstanding of the information 
shared; (2) unanticipated regulatory changes in the target’s country; (3) the acquirer made 
mistakes or did not evaluate the target’s information as fully and precisely as the acquirer 
should; (4) the target firm intentionally hid or fabricated its information before the 
announcement in order to sell or sell at a high premium (Akerlof, 1970; Anagnostopoulou & 
Tsekrekos, 2015; Reuer, 2005). While institutional theory provides us the environmental 
explanations on reason one and two because organizations are “purposive entities designed 
by their creators to maximize wealth, income, or other objectives defined by the opportunities 
afforded by the institutional structure of the society” (North, 1990: 73), operational risk helps 
us dive into the behavioral aspects of information asymmetry regarding the imperfect 
information on what the target firm has done in the past (e.g., reason four).  
 Using a sample of 8,008 cross-border M&As which includes 1,744 country pairs 
(target nation and acquirer nation) during 1996 to 2016, we find that the better the acquiring 
(i.e., acquirer’s) country’s governance quality is, the lower the likelihood of the deal 
abandonment. Furthermore, when the selling (i.e., target’s) country’s governance quality is 
also high, the acquiring country’s governance quality decreases even more of the likelihood 
of the deal abandonment. Additionally, the level of acquiring or selling country’s operational 
risk has different moderating effect on the acquirer governance as well. When the acquirer is 
from a country with strong governance mechanisms as well as high operational risk, the 
acquirer is even less likely to abandon the deal with the foreign target. However, in 
comparison, when the target is from a country with high operational risk, the acquiring 
country’s governance quality would not have an as strong effect on mitigating the deal 
closing risk.  
One major contribution of Essay II is that we extend the scope and effect of 
institutional theory in firm internationalization strategy by cooperating the role of another 
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contemporary country-level factor, operational risk. Institutional theory has provided us the 
regulatory explanations through countries’ regulative, normative, and cognitive pillars in 
international business activities (North 1990; Scott, 1995). Institutional distance, as the key 
driver of “liability of foreignness” (Eden & Miller, 2004), offers rich and meaningful insights 
on the performance and strategy making of firms’ internationalization. Although 
organizations are assumed to modify “in the direction of increasing compatibility with 
environmental characteristics” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p.149), employees are subjective 
and “act on their own perceptions and act in unpredictable as well as predictable ways” 
(Astley & Van De Ven, 1983). By applying the concept of operational risk, we combine the 
“rules of the game” and organizational actions, enriching the institutional theory with a 
behavioral aspect or a measured outcome of enforcement. Operational risk is a contemporary 
measure of organizational behavior with country-level variations, which further helps the 
institutional theory to identify the co-evolutionary and dynamic effect between MNEs 
activities and governance development.  
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ESSAY I: 
MITIGATING POST-ACQUISITION RISK:  
THE INTERPLAY OF CROSS-BORDER UNCERTAINTIES 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Do international acquisitions increase acquirers’ risk? If so, can cross-border uncertainties 
interact and offset such risk? The perspective of integrated risk management suggests 
international acquirers could mitigate their overall risk through the interplay of various levels 
of uncertainties. Using asset pricing to measure shifts in risk and a large sample of 
international acquisitions by US firms during 2000-2014, we find that acquirers can reduce 
their risk by trading internal and deal-level risk factors (information asymmetry and moral 
hazard) off against external and country-level risk factors (“liability of foreignness” and 
“double-layered acculturation”).  
 
 
Keywords: risk; mergers and acquisitions; international; cultural distance; institutional 
distance 
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite the substantial uncertainty surrounding the global marketplace, the market of 
international mergers and acquisitions (M&As) has been particularly active. Due to the 
exciting and often contentious nature of M&A activities, scholars from various disciplines 
have studied the acquisition behaviour of multinational enterprises (MNEs) extensively. Even 
with the wealth of research, international M&As have been reported to present very high 
failure rates, often ranging between 45% and 67% (Mukherji, Dibrell, & Francis, 2013). 
While risk is a well-defined predictor of failure, most studies place a disproportionate focus 
on the return side of performance (Lee & Caves, 1998; Park & Russo, 1996). To better 
understand the high failure rate of M&As, the examination of M&A risk is essential. Thus, in 
this article, we investigate whether cross-border M&As involve increased risk for the 
acquirer and if so what international acquirers should do to offset the increased risk.  
The theoretical foundation of our paper lies in Miller’s (1992) perspective of 
integrated risk management, suggesting international acquirers should utilize simultaneous 
trade-offs among various levels of uncertainties for strategic international risk management. 
In other words, the various uncertainties encountered by an MNE can interplay and reduce 
the firm’s overall risk. Building on Miller’s (1992) work, a small number of scholars find that 
MNEs can actually utilize integrated risk management to reduce risk across varied contexts. 
Shrader, Oviatt, and McDougall (2000) show how new ventures can manage their risk by 
trading three factors off against each other: foreign location, entry mode, and the proportion 
of revenue exposed to certain locations. Das and Teng (1998) recommend understanding the 
behaviour of strategic alliances by integrating resource and risk dimensions. In supply chain 
risk management, it is crucial to acknowledge the interacting effects of supply risks, demand 
risks, and operational risks (Manuj & Mentzer, 2008). In line with this important body of 
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literature, our study employs the integrated risk management perspective in the context of 
cross-border M&As. 
Among the extant research on cross-border M&As, the studies of Chari and Chang 
(2009) and Reuer, Shenkar, and Ragozzino (2004) stand out for probing the risk dimension of 
M&As. Building on their significant developments, our study offers two extensions: First, 
while these studies focus on a single source of risk, we address risk more holistically. 
Specifically, Reuer et al. (2004) examine risk mitigation by performance-contingent payout 
(i.e., stock payment or earnouts). Since contingent payout is a payment method that depends 
on the success of the deal and the performance of the target, it addresses the information 
asymmetry problem and transfers the acquirer’s downside risk to the target. Nonetheless, 
information asymmetry, leading to the risk of adverse selection, is only one source of risk in 
cross-border M&As. Chari and Chang (2009), on the other hand, explore the determinants of 
share of equity. While share of equity does have implications for resource commitment, risk, 
returns, and control, it is not an explicit measure of risk. Expanding on these two studies, we 
address the risk of cross-border M&As via a more direct and precise approach. Second, the 
above studies directly examine the determinants or risk factors, which shows that they 
assume the factors are competing rather than complementary in nature. In contrast, we 
emphasize the complementary interplay effect among the sources of risk, and allow the risk 
factors to interact with each other.  
International M&A research concludes that the key risk factors are information 
asymmetry, moral hazard, and country-level uncertainties such as the “liability of 
foreignness” and “double-layered acculturation” (Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996; Eden & 
Miller, 2004). The “liability of foreignness” stresses the social cost of doing business abroad, 
which results from the unfamiliarity that foreign firms face (Eden & Miller, 2004). A foreign 
firm engaged in M&As also deals with the issue of double-layered acculturation, which refers 
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to the cultural distances at both the country and corporate level (Barkema et al., 1996). To 
understand the behaviour of cross-border M&A risk and to assess the efficacy of mitigation 
channels, we exploit the complementary and competing effects of these risk factors through 
their indicators: industry relatedness, cultural distance, and institutional distance. Industry 
relatedness indicates the organizational similarity in terms of business traits and goals, which 
implies the degree of information asymmetry and moral hazard problems. Institutional 
distance is the key driver behind the “liability of foreignness” (Eden & Miller, 2004). Finally, 
cultural distance at the country level measures the outer layer of “double-layered 
acculturation”.  
Using a sample of 1,874 international acquisitions by US firms from 2000 to 2014, we 
find significant moderating effects among industry relatedness, cultural distance, and 
institutional distance on acquirers’ post-acquisition risk. For instance, while industry 
relatedness on its own increases post-acquisition systematic risk, the presence of cultural 
distance can (at least partially) offset such risk effects. In other words, if a firm acquires a 
related target in a culturally distant country, post-takeover risk decreases. If, on the other 
hand, the target is in a culturally similar country, the acquirer experiences an even more 
pronounced increase in risk. Therefore, “double-layered acculturation” can act as a risk 
mitigation scenario for cross-border acquirers. Futhermore, the increased risk from industry 
relatedness can also be mitigated by institutional distance, especially when the related targets 
are from upstream institutions (i.e., countries with better institutional development than the 
US). Lastly, we find that acquirers’ risk declines when the targets are from upstream 
countries with both culturally and institutionally distant environments. Our results therefore 
support our theoretical proposition: strategic international risk, examined in the context of 
cross-border M&As in our study, is subject to an array of simultaneous trade-offs among the 
risks of adverse selection, moral hazard, and target-country distance.  
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 Our study provides three contributions. First, we bridge a gap in the international 
business (IB) literature on risk as the performance outcome; while the literature is rich with 
theory and empirical evidence on the outcomes of internationalization strategies, it is 
disproportionately focused on returns. However, returns are just one facet of performance, 
which cannot illustrate the full outcomes of internationalization. Along with the attainment of 
economic rents, managing risks is a primary objective of firms operating internationally 
(Ghoshal, 1987; Miller, 1992). By studying risk as the performance outcome, we open a 
debate to investigate, quantify, and mitigate strategic international risks. Second, we 
contribute to the theory of integrated risk management (Miller, 1992). The dominant theories 
explaining the cross-border M&A phenomenon are transaction cost economics (TCE), 
ownership-location-internalization (OLI), and the resource-based view (RBV). While these 
theories build a strong foundation within this body of literature, Miller’s framework provides 
a unique perspective on theorizing about cross-border M&A risk. Our study extends his 
integrated risk framework in the specific context of cross-border M&As. We posit that 
acquirers can leverage internal factors from deal-level characteristics to offset external risks 
coming from country-level factors. Third, we contribute to the cross-border M&A literature 
by providing a measure of risk. Despite the extensive research on cross-border M&As, we are 
not close to explaining the high failure rates as we tend to overlook risk (Haleblian, Devers, 
McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009). Scholars have recently focused on examining 
abnormal returns as the performance measure. Abnormal returns estimate the difference 
between actual and expected returns, which assumes risk to be time-invariant across pre- and 
post-announcement periods. Thus, they fail to account for possible shifts in the volatility – 
hence the risk – of stock returns. Instead, we measure the acquirers’ post-acquisition shift in 
systematic risk from the difference between pre- and post-announcement periods, using the 
Carhart Four-Factor Model (Lubatkin & O’Neill, 1987).  
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 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we discuss the 
theoretical framework and put forward testable hypotheses. Then, we present our empirical 
data and methodology. The fourth section illustrates the results and the fifth provides 
robustness checks for our study. The last section concludes.    
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND   
As one of the primary objectives of MNEs, risk management is a critical area in need of 
contemporary theorization and quantitative mitigation (Ghoshal, 1987; Lee & Caves, 1998). 
In the past, scholars and risk managers have treated risk purely in terms of one particular type 
of uncertainty, excluding other existing ones. With the development of globalization and 
technology, the risk manager is increasingly becoming involved in managing a broader 
spectrum of risks facing the firm (Colquitt, Hoyt, & Lee, 1999). In the context of IB, MNEs 
face various and numerous levels of uncertainties, ranging from the firm level to the general 
environmental level, which makes IB inherently risky. The complexity of uncertainties for 
MNEs drove the development of integrated risk management especially for IB (Miller, 1992, 
1998). Specifically, Miller (1992) proposed a framework with multiple dimensions of risks 
for international businesses. These multiple dimensions of risks are suggested to be 
simultaneously determined, or interrelated, rather than operating independently of each other. 
Truly, MNEs’ financial (or foreign exchange) risk is highly related to their strategic risk. The 
failure to hedge a firm’s exposure to foreign exchange risk would risk the success or 
performance of a firm’s strategies.  
Miller’s (1992) perspective of interdependencies between risk factors formulates his 
insight: managing those risks often involves trade-offs. A trade-off between exposures to 
various uncertainties means that a reduction of one uncertainty may result in increased 
exposure to another uncertainty (Miller, 1992). Thus, MNEs can manage multiple IB risks by 
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trading one risk off against another to keep the overall risk lower than it would be without 
such trade-offs (Shrader et al., 2000). As mentioned before, IB scholars have theoretically 
developed and empirically tested the theory of integrated risk management in the context of 
new ventures, supply chain risk management, and strategic alliances. This paper further 
employs the theory in the context of international M&As, considering the various levels of 
risk factors acquirers face.   
Information asymmetry between the acquirer and the target is the primary risk factor 
in M&As, existing when the bidder lacks precise or sufficient information about the target 
(Chari & Chang, 2009; Reuer et al., 2004). When asymmetrical information prevails between 
two companies, the acquirer faces the risk of adverse selection (i.e., overpayment) due to an 
inaccurate evaluation of the target’s value or excessive transaction costs during the 
negotiation phase. As Mukherji et al. (2013) point out, information asymmetry is a major 
source of overbidding risk, particularly due to the misevaluation of intangible assets. In 
addition to adverse selection as the ex-ante valuation uncertainty (i.e., risk prior to deal 
completion), moral hazard problems (Alchian & Woodward, 1988; Holmstrom, 1982) are 
also likely to occur both before and after deal completion. On the one hand, to the extent that 
CEOs influence board decisions on compensation, as supported by the “managerial power” 
view, acquisitions can be used by CEOs as justification for additional compensation 
(Grinstein & Hribar, 2004). Since compensation contracts are often not designed perfectly, 
managers may also be allowed to extract rents that are linked to the completion or size of a 
deal, rather than its performance1. On the other hand, following deal completion, information 
asymmetry between the owner and the manager – as well as that between the managers of the 
bidder and the target – may continue to exist. The acquirer is therefore exposed to further 
                                                 
1 Grinstein and Hribar (2004) report that, in 4 out of 10 deals in their sample, deal completion was cited as a criterion for the 
provision bonuses, averaging over $1.4 million on top of any other compensation. 
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uncertainty and moral hazard problems, factors often cited as potential causes of integration 
failure (Chi, 1994). 
The risk of adverse selection and moral hazard problems are common factors in 
M&As, and are internal or endogenous uncertainties for acquirers. Following Gatignon and 
Anderson (1988), we consider risk factors that are limited to within organizations (i.e., the 
acquirer and the target) as internal uncertainty. These internal risk factors are exacerbated 
when it comes to cross-border M&As (Gatignon & Anderson, 1988). In an international 
context, internal risk factors (adverse selection and moral hazard problems) are amplified by 
external influences such as the “liability of foreignness” and “double-layered acculturation” 
(Aybar & Ficici, 2009; Barkema et al., 1996; Eden & Miller, 2004). Being exposed to 
“double-layered acculturation”, acquirers not only encounter the target’s different 
organizational culture but also often compete with its different national culture. These 
external risks result from differences in national culture, institutional environments, business 
practices, and customer behaviors, which heighten information asymmetry and complexity.  
Studies in international economics and finance have approached the issue from the 
theoretical and empirical lens of “familiarity” or cultural affinity (Guiso, Sapienza, & 
Zingales, 2009). In general, investors appear reluctant to hold the securities of firms they are 
not familiar with, a principle which also explains “home bias” in investment portfolios, 
overseas listing decisions etc. As Chan, Covrig, and Ng (2005) also reveal, investors may 
even present foreign bias, by overweighting their portfolios towards certain foreign markets, 
depending on the level of economic development, market capitalization, transaction costs, or 
any factors reducing information asymmetry. The same norm has been found to apply in 
overseas-listing decisions, with companies showing preferences for foreign markets with 
geographical proximity or other familiar characteristics, explaining the propensity of US 
issuers to cross-list in Canada, the United Kingdom, and certain European countries. In the 
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domain of cross-border M&As – where cross-cultural interactions between acquirers and 
targets are expected to be more intense – Siegel, Licht, and Schwartz (2011) document that 
the distance between origin and destination countries regarding critical informal institutions, 
such as cultural egalitarianism, not only explains the home bias in portfolio holdings and 
acquisition volume, but also the value destruction in cross-border M&As. Furthermore, 
Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi’s (2015) recent work gives further empirical support to the 
view that distance in cultural values negatively influences merger activity and acquirer 
returns. The above theoretical and empirical lens from international finance corroborates the 
IB paradigm that MNEs in general, and international acquirers in particular, face unfavorable 
odds when engaging in cross-border strategic investments.  
However, in cross-border acquisitions, internal risk factors (adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems) and external uncertainties (“liability of foreignness” and “double-
layered acculturation”) are complementary and overlapping (Chari & Chang, 2009; Reuer & 
Koza, 2000). Moreover, these internal (firm-level) and external (country-level) uncertainties 
are interrelated and can thus be traded off against alternative firm strategies (Miller, 1992). In 
other words, according to Miller’s (1992) integrated risk management perspective, when a 
firm’s exposure to one level of uncertainty increases, its exposure to another level of 
uncertainty decreases, and the firm can manage its risk by adjusting its strategy through 
simultaneous trade-offs among the levels of uncertainties. To be more specific to our context, 
international acquirers can mitigate their risk by simultaneously trading the external 
uncertainties (“liability of foreignness” and “double-layered acculturation”) off against 
internal uncertainties (adverse selection and moral hazard problems). From earlier studies, 
acquirers could passively mitigate their risk by controlling the equity sought or the payment 
method. In our study, we integrate the internal with the external risk factors, allowing the 
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acquirers to mitigate their risk in an active fashion. We utilize such indicators of uncertainties 
as industry relatedness, institutional distance, and cultural distance. 
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Industry Relatedness  
Synergy theory argues that related acquisitions – where acquirers and targets share strategic 
interdependence, redeploy resources, and combine at an operating level – will produce 
benefits (Capron, Dussauge, & Mitchell, 1998). In related acquisitions, it is easier for the 
acquirer to evaluate the target’s business and value because of the similarities, reducing the 
degree of information asymmetry and subsequent moral hazard problems. Thus, the acquirer 
is – at least in theory – subject to a lower risk of adverse selection (Chari & Chang, 2009; 
Reuer et al., 2004). However, many acquisitions that are potentially synergistic fail to create 
value or even ultimately lead to divestitures (Bergh, 1997; Davidson III, Rosenstein, & 
Sundaram, 2002). In order to benefit from operational synergies, related acquisitions require 
the bidders to invest heavily in implementation (or integration) after the deal. These 
implementation costs are higher in a cross-border context, due to the distance between the 
acquirer and the target in terms of culture, geography, and institutions (Chakrabarti & 
Mitchell, 2016). In the meantime, the high implementation costs have a larger impact in an 
international context for related acquisitions than unrelated ones (Chakrabarti & Mitchell, 
2016).  
Furthermore, the acquisition of related targets tends to drive acquirers’ confidence and 
hubris up because the acquirer feels they know enough about the target’s business (Lubatkin 
& O’Neill, 1987). Assuming there is sufficient and symmetric information about the target’s 
business, an acquirer is more likely to underestimate the implementation costs and 
consolidation efforts. Integration costs often exceed the expected value of the synergies, thus 
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contributing to value destruction and the risk of integration failure. By underestimating costs 
and under-resourcing consolidation efforts, acquirers are prone to neglect important 
administrative functions (Kitching, 1967). Therefore, the more related a target is, the higher 
the risk of administrative business and integration failure is.   
 Singh and Montgomery (1987) argue that related acquisitions provide the acquirer 
with greater economies of scale and scope, while unrelated ones are likely to achieve 
financial and administrative synergies. Thus, unrelated cross-border acquisitions have more 
potential to lower the acquirer’s cost of capital (Chatterjee, 1986). As a lower cost of capital 
reduces the required rate of return on investment, it allows for further investment 
opportunities, thus bringing higher value and lower systematic risk for the firm, all other 
things being equal (Lubatkin & O’Neill, 1987). In addition, unrelated overseas acquisitions 
are known to be more “satisfactory vehicles” for risk reduction than domestic ones, because 
of the diversification into international markets (Hisey & Caves, 1985; Seth, Song, & Pettit, 
2002). We therefore expect that related cross-border M&As will be accompanied by higher 
risk than unrelated ones ceteris paribus. 
 
H1: Industry relatedness between the acquirer and the target increases the acquirer’s 
risk in cross-border M&As. 
 
Cultural Distance 
The research on the impact of cultural distance on M&A outcomes has been inconclusive and 
contradictory (Björkman, Stahl, & Vaara, 2007; Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee, & 
Jayaraman, 2009). On the one hand, cultural distance at the country level may provide 
strengths and advantages to the acquirer, assuming they have pre-deal awareness of the 
cultural difference and are well-prepared for the challenges it will pose (Chakrabarti et al., 
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2009). On the other hand, cultural distance is found to impede the integration and capability 
transfer because of so-called “double-layered acculturation” (Barkema et al., 1996), with one 
layer arising from difficulties at the organizational culture level and the other at the national 
culture level. Acquirer and target have to combine both levels of cultural differences. In 
addition, as Siegel et al. (2011) suggest, as cultural distance increases, target-firm 
stakeholders may become more difficult to deal with, subsidiary management becomes harder 
to monitor, and negotiations become more complex and costlier, ultimately giving rise to a 
risk of the deal being abandoned altogether. We therefore argue that “double-layered 
acculturation” can actually increase acquirer risk in cross-border M&As. The outer layer of 
country-level differences amplifies the risk generated by the inner layer of organization-level 
differences. Thus, we expect that cultural distance between the acquirer and the target at the 
country level will increase the acquirer’s risk in international M&As.  
 
H2: Cultural distance between the acquirer’s country and the target’s country 
increases the acquirer’s risk in cross-border M&As. 
 
Institutional Distance 
Country governance is defined as the tradition and institutions by which authority is 
exercised (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2011). The difference in country governance (i.e., 
institutional distance) between the acquirer and the target is the key driver behind the 
“liability of foreignness” (Eden & Miller, 2004). Thus, institutional distance is a critical 
factor for cross-border M&A performance. Scholars have examined its influences on the 
acquirer’s abnormal returns (Chari, Ouimet, & Tesar, 2009; Ellis, Moeller, Schlingemann, & 
Stulz, 2017; Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray, Sarkar, & Chittoor, 2010), deal completion or abandonment 
(Dikova, Sahib, & Van Witteloostuijn, 2010; Zhou, Xie, & Wang, 2016), and target 
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premiums (Bris & Cabolis, 2008; Weitzel & Berns, 2006). Kwok and Reeb (2000), propose 
an upstream-downstream hypothesis, which states that MNEs going upstream (i.e., 
internationalizing into a more institutionally developed economy) experience a risk reduction, 
but those going downstream (i.e., internationalizing into a less institutionally developed 
economy) experience a risk increase. Upstream institutions provide more economic and 
political stability, which decreases the acquirer’s currency and governance risk. Also, in an 
upstream environment, assets and investments are easier for the acquirer to expropriate and 
exploit, which decreases its financial risk.  
More recent work supports country governance being portable in M&As (Bris, 
Brisley, & Cabolis, 2008; Chari et al., 2009; Ellis, Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2017), 
such that MNEs acquiring downstream targets can transfer their relatively better governance, 
thus facilitating resource redeployment, exploration, and diversification of their strategic 
assets. By sharing and transferring, the acquirer can improve the target’s value by controlling 
its corporate governance practices in its accounting, legal regulations, operational process etc. 
Therefore, acquiring downstream targets may ultimately decrease acquirers’ risk.  
Drawing from Kwok and Reeb (2000) above, but also acknowledging the portability 
of country governance, we therefore posit that: 
 
H3: Institutional distance between the acquirer’s country and a downstream target’s 
country decreases the acquirer’s risk in cross-border M&As.  
H4: Institutional distance between the acquirer’s country and an upstream target’s 
country decreases the acquirer’s risk in cross-border M&As. 
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Industry Relatedness and Cultural Distance 
With increasing M&A activities, international acquirers have prior awareness of the cultural 
distance of a target’s nation and its potential influences on negotiation and integration 
(Chakrabarti et al., 2009). The awareness of information asymmetry due to cultural distance 
outstrips neglect or overconfidence coming from industry relatedness. Acquirers will likely 
engage more thoroughly with ex-ante M&A procedures such as screening, selection, 
evaluation, due diligence, and contracting. In other words, when acquiring a culturally distant 
target, the bidder will assume similarly high levels of information asymmetry for related as 
for unrelated targets. In the same vein, during the ex-post integration phase, acquirers – 
conscious of the cultural differences – will be better prepared for potential obstacles. This 
preparation will make the acquirers less likely to underestimate the implementation costs and 
potential hurdles in integrations with related targets when the firms are culturally disparate 
(Chakrabarti et al., 2009). Therefore, while acquirers may underestimate integration and 
consolidation costs in related acquisitions (Lubatkin & O’Neill, 1987), the presence of high 
cultural distance will incite more rigorous ex-ante and ex-post M&A procedures, which will 
offset any overlooked aspects due to industry relatedness. Therefore, we propose that cultural 
distance will facilitate the operational synergy stemming from industry relatedness, and thus 
the interaction between cultural distance and industry relatedness will reduce the acquirer’s 
risk in cross-border M&As. In other words:  
 
H5: The higher the cultural distance between the acquirer’s and the target’s nations, 
the lower is the effect of industry relatedness on the acquirer’s shift in risk. 
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Industry Relatedness and Institutional Distance 
In the context of cross-border M&As, as we argued above, the risks of moral hazard and 
information asymmetry are heightened, especially when the acquisition target is in a related 
industry. However, high institutional distance may allow the acquirer to experience a risk 
reduction either by allowing more autonomy to the target, or simply by taking advantage of 
the reduced sensitivity to market shocks. 
The more related a target is to the bidder, the more likely corporate managers are to 
reinforce consolidation efforts, rather than execute autonomous management within the 
subsidiary (Lubatkin & O’Neill, 1987). This can increase integration efforts and lead to 
losses associated with deal implementation risk (i.e. employee turnover, litigation, etc.). In 
fact, Salomon and Wu (2012, p. 344) suggest that “Foreign firms from more institutionally 
distant home countries are more likely to adopt local isomorphism strategies to acquire 
legitimacy and mitigate the liability of foreignness.” As such – particularly for related deals – 
in cases of high institutional distance acquirers are more likely to allow organizational 
autonomy to the target in order to better adopt the host country’s institutions and norms. This 
will in turn not only better help acquirers to reduce risks associated with legitimacy costs, but 
also ultimately facilitate integration and mitigate the implementation uncertainties described 
above. In other words, while for domestic deals quick and effective integration can shield 
acquirers from risks associated with diseconomies of scale, in the presence of institutional 
distance bidders will not rush to impose an integration mandate unless it is reasonably safe 
and prudent to do so.  
In addition, despite the stylized fact in international finance that countries exhibit high 
stock market integration or interdependence (Forbes & Rigobon, 2002; Lee, 2006), 
institutional distance has been found to reduce market co-movement. Specifically, across 
global markets, the development of similar principal institutions (e.g., political and legal 
- 30 - 
 
systems) increases the co-movement of stock returns, while institutional distance decreases it 
(Tavares, 2009). Therefore, it can be argued that institutional distance, by reducing market 
interdependence between the acquirer and target countries, can also act as a “cushion” to 
industry-specific shocks (i.e. from regulatory shifts, supply and labor shortages, etc), thereby 
mitigating the acquirer’s sensitivity to home-host market uncertainties.  
Therefore, institutional distance can act as a risk mitigation device for related 
acquisitions from both downstream and upstream countries; however, since the magnitude of 
the effects for the downstream and upstream countries may differ, we make two distinct 
hypotheses:  
 
H6: The higher the institutional distance between the acquirer’s country and a 
downstream target’s country, the lower is the effect of industry relatedness on the 
acquirer’s shift in risk.  
H7: The higher the institutional distance between the acquirer’s country and an 
upstream target’s country, the lower is the effect of industry relatedness on the 
acquirer’s shift in risk. 
 
Cultural Distance and Institutional Distance 
Culture is embedded in organizational structures and management styles (Schneider, 1990). 
Thus, with awareness of potential integration problems, the acquirer is expected to possess a 
diverse set of routines and repertoires as a result of acquiring culturally distant targets 
(Morosini, Shane, & Singh, 1998). Such diversity increases the acquirer’s innovation and 
thus competitiveness in the long run. Nevertheless, since cultural values guide managers’ 
decision-making towards risk and return (Li, Griffin, Yue, & Zhao, 2013; March & Shapira, 
1987), diversity in managerial risk-taking and opportunity recognition might also be affected. 
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What may be perceived as risk by managers in the acquirer’s country might be treated as 
opportunity in the target’s.  
With culturally different targets, acquirers are hence able to diversify their portfolio of 
managerial risk-taking. After all, subsidiaries and headquarters enjoy different standards and 
levels of risk and opportunity assessment, which drives diverse investment opportunities and 
uncorrelated operating earnings. Thus, by acquiring culturally distant targets, acquirers will 
build stronger internal resilience against market uncertainty. In addition, like institutional 
distance, cultural distance has been reported to result in lower levels of market co-movement 
(Lucey & Zhang, 2010). Thus, with both institutional distance and cultural distance, acquirers 
can not only strengthen their internal resilience, but also reduce their sensitivity to market-
level shocks, ultimately reducing their combined systematic risk.  
Following Kwok and Reeb (2000), acquirers of upstream targets (where the acquirer’s 
institutional environment is less developed than the target’s) have a better ability to arbitrage 
markets and leverage their capabilities towards reducing risk. On the other hand, acquirers of 
downstream targets (acquirer’s institutional environment is more developed than the target’s) 
enjoy the portability of corporate governance and improve their targets’ capabilities at 
resource exploitation, which also decreases their exposure to regulatory and environmental 
uncertainties. We therefore posit that, in the presence of high institutional distance (from 
either downstream or upstream markets), acquiring a culturally distant target will mitigate the 
acquirer’s risk; however, as in H3 and H4 above, we appreciate that the effects of 
downstream and upstream distance may differ in magnitude, so we put forward two distinct 
hypotheses:   
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H8: The higher the institutional distance between the acquirer’s country and a 
downstream target’s country, the lower is the effect of cultural distance on the 
acquirer’s shift in risk. 
H9: The higher the institutional distance between the acquirer’s country and an 
upstream target’s country, the lower is the effect of cultural distance on the acquirer’s 
shift in risk.  
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The Sample of Cross-border M&As 
We collected data on US acquirers and foreign targets in completed deals from Thomson 
EIKON Deals (formerly Thomson One - SDC), combining it with archival accounting data 
from Compustat and share price data from CRSP. To include a merger in our sample, we 
employed a number of criteria in line with the majority of the relevant empirical studies. Our 
original sample included all completed deals during the period 2000-2014, where the acquirer 
was a US firm listed on one of the three main US exchanges (i.e. New York Stock Exchange; 
NASDAQ; AMEX) and the target was a non-US firm, either public or private. The size of the 
deal had to exceed $1 million with a minimum of a 5% stake sought by the acquirer during 
the deal. To ensure that the voting and cash flow rights in the target company were 
transferred to the shareholders of the acquirer, acquisitions of associates and minority stakes 
were also excluded from the analysis, and the acquirer’s stake in the target company after 
deal completion had to exceed 50%. Broadly, these baseline parameters ensured that only 
significant and representative takeover deals would be included in the sample, while the 
exchange of small (minority) stakes and any similar over-the-counter transactions would be 
excluded. In addition to the above, sufficient, reliable, and accurate data for a number of 
essential accounting variables had to be available from Compustat and CRSP. These 
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screening criteria and this procedure resulted in a sample of 1,893 cross-border deals for 
which we were able to collect data on all of the necessary variables. 
 
Dependent Variable and Model Specification 
With respect to measuring cross-border M&A risk, Lee and Caves (1998) suggest three 
alternatives: the variance of profits, the variance of abnormal stock market returns, and the 
turnover of a foreign subsidiary through shutdown and divestiture. Based on detailed 
comparisons and high correlations among these three measures (Lee & Caves, 1998), we 
measure M&A risk by stock market volatility using Carhart’s Four-Factor Model (1997).  
In modern portfolio theory, risk comprises two main components, namely systematic 
risk, broadly defined as a firm’s returns sensitivity to market returns, and unsystematic (or 
idiosyncratic) risk, which is the uncertainty specific to particular assets or firms. While 
unsystematic risk is inherent to a specific firm or industry, due to various unexpected factors 
– such as a new market entrant, regulatory shifts, shortages in labor, parts, etc. – systematic 
risk arises from market-wide shocks – such as changes in GDP, inflation, interest rates, 
government policies, or even acts of nature – which introduce uncertainty across all market 
participants. In asset pricing, investors – and by extension firms – can diversify away the 
unsystematic component of risk (i.e. firm-specific risk) by holding a broad range of asset 
classes, which cancel each other out. However, since the exposure of a portfolio to the entire 
market cannot be mitigated through diversification, systematic risk remains the component 
with the most relevance for firms and investors. As cross-border acquisitions can utilize 
differences across international markets, they are devices firms may be able to use to lower 
their systematic risk. Therefore, systematic risk is a particularly relevant measure of risk for 
our analysis.  
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While standard event study methodologies normally estimate the information content 
of M&A announcements and other news, by means of abnormal returns, using some variant 
of the market model benchmark, we take a different approach. Unlike ordinary events that 
mainly influence cash flows – and whose information content can be estimated by a standard 
event study – a merger causes changes in both the risk and returns of individual securities. As 
a matter of fact, Brown, Harlow, & Tinic (1988) showed that many events cause the variance 
of returns to shift due to a temporary (or permanent) shift in systematic risk, so that the use of 
common methods may fail (Boehmer, Masumeci, & Poulsen, 1991). If the news about the 
merger impacts on a firm’s systematic risk, on top of any future cash flows, benchmark 
parameters (factor loadings) estimated unconditionally during the estimation period (pre 
M&A announcement) will be biased and unable to be employed in the event window (post 
M&A announcement), since the betas may have shifted. Most event studies use pre-
announcement benchmark parameters to estimate post-announcement returns, while our aim 
is to actually model possible shifts in risk. Therefore, following MacKinlay (1997), to address 
whether an event impacts on risk we need to formulate the market model to allow betas to 
change over the event.  
In modeling the share price returns of cross-border acquirers, we opt for the Carhart 
Four-Factor Model. While the majority of the literature has examined similar events using 
residuals from single-factor asset pricing models, such as the market model or the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), multifactor models have been reported to explain more 
variation in the cross-section of average stock returns (over 95% compared to 70% on 
average by the CAPM). Fama and French (1993), particularly, point out that residuals from 
three-factor regressions will do a better job in isolating the firm-specific components of 
returns in event studies of the stock-price response to firm-specific information. A multifactor 
model is therefore more apt for the purposes of our study. 
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Using daily share price returns data from CRSP, we first calculate Total Risk as the 
total variability in a security’s returns (Lubatkin & O’Neill, 1987), measured as the standard 
deviation of a firm’s returns after accounting for the risk-free rate, σ . Thus, we 
calculate the standard deviation of the daily returns for each acquirer six months (120 trading 
days) before and six months after a cross-border M&A announcement as 
follows: .  
To estimate the acquirer’s systematic risk before and after each announcement we use 
the Carhart Four-Factor Model:  
 (1) 
where is the excess return of firm i minus the one-month T-bill (risk-free) return at 
time t. In the Carhart Four-Factor Model,  is the risk-adjusted abnormal return of firm i; 
is the difference between the daily NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ value-weighted 
market portfolio returns and the risk-free return; high minus low (HML) is the difference 
between the returns on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and a portfolio of low book-
to-market stocks; small minus big (SMB) is the difference between the returns on a portfolio 
of small stocks and a portfolio of large stocks and is a proxy for small-firm risk; up minus 
down (UMD) is the return on a zero-cost portfolio that is long previous return winners and 
short previous loser stocks, which controls for momentum, the empirically observed tendency 
for rising asset prices to rise further and falling prices to keep falling. Therefore, the four risk 
parameter coefficients (factor loadings)  jointly represent the systematic risk of the firm.  
Having estimated risk parameters for every firm in our sample during both periods, 
before and after the merger announcement, we proceed to calculate Systematic Risk 
for each period, by adjusting Total Risk  using the coefficient of 
determination (R2) of eq. 1 above as follows:  
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 (2) 
Finally, we calculate the annualized systematic risk for the two periods as 
      (3) 
and our dependent variable (∆Risk) is the difference in the annualized systematic risk of the 
acquirer’s stock returns during the 120 trading days after the acquisition announcement and 
that during the 120 trading days prior to the announcement:  
 
       (4) 
A positive value of ∆Risk indicates an increase in the systematic risk for the acquirer and a 
negative one suggests a decrease in the risk. To explain the variation in the post-acquisition 
changes in the acquirers’ risk and directly test our study hypotheses, we employ the following 
general equation: 
 
(5) 
where is Industry Relatedness for each deal (i) in the sample,  is the Cultural Distance 
between the acquirer’s (US) and the target’s nation,  and  is the Institutional 
Distance for downstream and upstream deals respectively,  denotes a set of control 
variables known to influence systematic risk, and  is a set of year fixed effects.  
 
Independent Variables 
We measure Industry Relatedness (IR) as a dummy variable, which equals one if the acquirer 
and the target share the same primary four-digit SIC industry code and zero otherwise. We 
calculate Cultural Distance (CD) based on Hofstede’s (2001) four cultural dimensions, using 
the composite measure from Zhou et al. (2016). Specifically, for each M&A deal in our 
dataset we compute the cultural distance as , where  and  denote 
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the cultural scores of the target and home (US) countries respectively. Kaufmann et al. (2011) 
measure country governance quality using World Governance Indicators (published by the 
World Bank) on control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, 
regulatory quality, rule of law, and voice and accountability. Following Ellis et al. (2017), we 
measure Institutional Distance (ID) as the averaged differences between the target country’s 
and the US’s scores on each dimension. We categorize ID into Downstream Institutional 
Distance (IDD) when ID is negative and into Upstream Institutional Distance (IDU) when ID 
is positive.  
 
Control Variables 
To control for pre-acquisition risk-magnitude effects and also to calibrate our sample to the 
“regular” levels of systematic risk for each firm, we control for , the acquirer’s 
pre-M&A annualized risk during the six months prior to the announcement. We also expect 
the broader economic conditions and the mergers market to play a significant role in forming 
the acquirers’ post-merger risk reactions. Hence, we first employ the dummy variable 
Recession, which takes the value one for deals that took place during the global financial 
crisis of 2008-2010 and zero otherwise. Along the same lines, as merger waves are identified 
as a key driver of takeover activity in the M&A literature, we use the dummy variable 
Merger wave, which takes the value of one for deals that took place during 2003-2008 (the 6th 
wave) and after 2012 (the still ongoing 7th wave) and zero otherwise. Following Han (2007), 
we also control for changes in the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX), which represents the 
average implied volatility of the at-the-money index options 30 days before expiration and is 
therefore a valid proxy for the instantaneous volatility of the S&P 500 index. To proxy for 
market sentiment, we employ the American Association of Individual Investors (AAII) 
sentiment measure, deriving from a weekly (every Thursday) survey of individual investors, 
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where responses are classified as bullish, bearish, or neutral. Following Fisher and Statman 
(2006) and Kurov (2008), we compute an investor sentiment index as the number of bullish 
investors expressed as a percentage of the number of bullish plus bearish investors. We match 
both variables, ∆VIX and ∆Sentiment, to the event window of our dependent variable. ∆VIX 
is therefore measured as the difference in VIX and ∆Sentiment as the difference in the mean 
AAII sentiment, between 120 trading days after and 120 trading days prior to the 
announcement. 
We also control for deal-level variables that might confound our dependent variable. 
We control for the percentage of the deal value paid in Cash, since stock payments can 
reduce the information asymmetry by linking the payment to the target performance, while 
cash payments indicate confidence on the part of the acquirer about the deal. We also control 
for Relative Deal Size, the ratio of the total amount paid to the target, to the acquirer’s market 
value at the year-end prior to the deal. In addition, the Percent of Shares Acquired indicates 
the level of control the acquirer has over the target, which predicts the return and risk the 
acquirer shares with the target. Firm-level variables expected to influence our dependent 
variable are the acquirer’s Price/Book Ratio and Leverage (ratio of total debt to total assets). 
The Price/Book Ratio is used to control for whether the acquirer’s stock is undervalued or 
overvalued, while leverage is an important financial ratio predicting financial distress and 
failure (Beaver, 1966).  
 
Descriptive Statistics  
Table 1 shows the distribution of the sample by various groups. It is important to note that 
cross-border M&As, on average, generate a 0.18 (18%) significant increase in risk. Panel A 
presents the sample distribution across target nations. The UK and Canada are the top two 
target nations for US acquirers, making up 20% and 16% of our sample, respectively. In 
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addition, on average, the most significant risk increase comes from deals targeted in India, 
Italy, and Israel. While India, Italy, and Israel are the countries showing the greatest risk 
increase, they share different levels of cultural distance and/or institutional distance with the 
US. For example, India is very different in culture and institutions from the US, while Italy is 
more similar to the US in both respects. However, the deals targeted in both India and Italy 
show the largest increases in post-acquisition risk. Thus, preliminarily, cultural distance and 
institutional distance cannot fully explain the increase in the acquirer’s risk. In the countries 
at a high cultural distance from the US, we also see a worse institutional environment than 
that of the US (e.g., Mexico has a score of 20.54 for cultural distance and one of -1.39 for 
institutional distance). Panel B shows the distribution of the sample by acquirer’s industry. 
The business services and electronic equipment industries account for the largest percentages, 
at 21.1% and 12% of our sample. Pharmaceutical products, petroleum and natural gas, and 
precious metals respectively make 50.7%, 54.3%, and 64% related acquisitions, while 
banking acquirers make no related acquisitions. We cannot obtain a clear picture of the 
relationship between related acquisitions and the risk increase from Panel B. We distribute 
our sample by year in Panel C. The year 2008 sees a significant post-announcement risk 
increase of 0.64, while 2009 shows a significant risk decrease of -0.30, mainly attributable to 
the financial crisis. US cross-border acquirers in our sample also experienced significant risk 
increases in 2000 and 2002, and a significant risk decrease in 2012.  
 
------Insert Table 1 here----- 
 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations among all variables. 
The mean value of Industry Relatedness is 0.31, indicating that we have more unrelated than 
related acquisitions in our sample. The mean of Absolute Institutional Distance is 0.481, and 
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that of the indicator for Upstream deals is 0.67, which shows that US companies in our 
sample predominately acquire targets in upstream countries (UK, Canada, Germany, 
Australia), as is also shown in Table 1. Most of the deals are paid for in cash (93.32%) and 
US acquirers, on average, pursue a large, controlling stake (86.49%). Cross-correlations in 
the table are as expected and do not raise much concern about collinearity. It is noteworthy 
that Cultural Distance and our Upstream deals indicator present a relatively high negative 
correlation (-0.74), suggesting that target countries at a high cultural distance from the US in 
general present a poorer institutional environment. As Ahern et al. (2015) point out, national 
institutions are very likely interrelated with culture, such that cultural and institutional 
distances can be jointly and endogenously determined. While it is not the purpose of our 
study to make causal inferences between the two, high correlations across explanatory 
variables raise collinearity concerns. To address such concerns, care was taken to ensure that, 
in all econometric specifications, highly related terms were mean-centered and carefully 
combined. The splitting of our institutional distance measure into upstream and downstream 
measures (Kwok & Reeb, 2000) and the subsequent mean-centering of all distance scores 
was applied to help reduce first-order correlations to acceptable levels, while variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) were used to detect multicollinearity.  
 
------ Insert Table 2 here ------ 
 
RESULTS 
The results of the multivariate regression models are presented in Table 3. In the first column, 
the base model shows the coefficient estimates for the benchmark specification with an 
intercept and all control variables, for ∆Risk as the dependent variable. In column 2, the main 
effects model includes the direct effects from the independent variables (IR, CD, IDD and 
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IDU), including all controls and year fixed effects. In column 3, in the model labelled IR  
CD, we add the interaction term between Industry Relatedness and Cultural Distance. The 
model named IR  ID (column 4) presents the main effects plus two separate interaction 
terms between Industry Relatedness and Downstream Institutional Distance, and Industry 
Relatedness and Upstream Institutional Distance. Finally, in column 5, the model denoted by 
CD  ID shows the results for all main effects plus the two interaction terms between 
Downstream Institutional Distance and Cultural Distance and between Upstream 
Institutional Distance and Cultural Distance.  
 
------ Insert Table 3 here ------ 
 
 Several of our controls show significant effects on the acquirer’s risk change. Not 
surprisingly, pre-M&A Risk (T-120, T-1) has a negative relationship with ∆Risk, and acts as an 
effective control for the magnitude of the pre-acquisition (baseline) risk. Therefore, in the 
presence of this control, the remaining variance in ∆Risk is net of confounding or scaling 
properties. ∆VIX has a positive coefficient, suggesting that market volatility also amplifies an 
acquirer’s shift in systematic risk in our sample. Meanwhile, ∆Sentiment has a negative effect 
on ∆Risk, such that a generally bullish market sentiment reduces market risk. These controls 
confirm the validity of our dependent variable. It is noteworthy that, while the effect of 
Merger Wave is negative, the Recession dummy does not capture any of the acquirer’s risk 
change, despite the fact that, in Table 1 (Panel C), ∆Risk appears to spike around the 
recession period. We attribute this to the rather crude nature of the indicator variables, which 
span several years and thus do not capture the intricacies that single-year dummies would. In 
the subsequent estimations, we include year fixed effects to remedy this. According to the 
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positive coefficient of Relative Deal Size, the acquirer’s risk also increases post acquisition if 
the target size is large.  
 The two deal-level factors other than the relative deal size (percentage paid in cash 
and percentage of shares acquired) are not significant. The reason might be that these two 
variables do not present much variability in our sample of cross-border M&As. Apparently, 
cross-border US acquirers, at least in our sample, generally prefer full cash as the payment 
method (the mean and median of cash payment percentage are 93.32% and 100% as seen in 
Table 2) and they tend to fully acquire the target firm (the mean and median of percentage of 
shares acquired are 86.49% and 100%). Both firm-level controls, Price/Book Ratio and 
Leverage, are not significant.  
 The model of main effects shows that the effect of Industry Relatedness (IR) is 
positive and significant (β1 = 0.050, p<0.01), offering support to Hypothesis H1. As Industry 
Relatedness is a dummy variable, the coefficient of 0.05, suggests a 5% ceteris paribus 
increase in annualized risk for non-diversifying acquisitions, a value which is also 
economically significant. Therefore, contrary to Lubatkin and O’Neill (1987), who found 
relatedness to decrease risk in domestic acquisitions, we show that, in a cross-border context, 
relatedness (on its own) has a rather adverse effect on risk. Meanwhile, Cultural Distance 
(CD) and Institutional Distance (ID) do not appear – at least directly – to influence risk 
changes. The coefficient of cultural distance on the acquirer’s risk change is nearly zero and 
insignificant, showing that cultural distance at a country level does not appear to further 
amplify the increased risk stemming from cultural difference at an organizational level. 
Whether the nature of the effect of the two layers of “double-layered acculturation” is 
supplementary or complementary would be a rather interesting item for future investigations. 
Institutional distance both downstream and upstream decrease the acquirer’s post-acquisition 
risk, but the effects are not significant. One explanation could be that country-level 
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uncertainties alone do not necessarily pose difficulties or generate opportunities for acquirers. 
Acquirers need to exploit the integration effect between external (country-level) and internal 
(firm-level) risk factors to achieve a reduction in risk.   
 With the introduction of the first interaction term (model 3: IR  CD) into our model, 
after grand-mean-centering CD, the results of the main factors do not change, while the 
interaction term (IR  CD) has a negative effect on the risk change (β5 = -0.01, p<0.01), in 
support of H5. Thus, in cross-border M&As, relatedness and cultural distance complement 
each other in producing a risk reduction. As Figure 1 also illustrates, acquirers can best 
mitigate cross-border acquisition risks when they bid for related targets from culturally 
distant countries or unrelated targets from culturally proximate countries. In line with the 
integrated risk management perspective, the results support that the sources of risk behind the 
two layers of “double-layered acculturation” can simultaneously balance off against each 
other, reducing overall post-acquisition risk. 
 
------ Insert Figure 1 here ------ 
 
In column 4 of Table 3 (model IR x ID), the results support that US acquirers can 
mitigate their risk from related acquisitions by bidding for institutionally distant targets from 
either downstream (β6 = -0.177, p<0.01) or upstream (β7 = -0.401, p<0.05) countries. 
Therefore, H6 and H7 are both supported, while – also in line with our expectations – the 
effects on the upstream and downstream sides differ in magnitude. Since the effect size of 
Upstream is around three times bigger than that of Downstream, acquirers enjoy the greatest 
risk reduction by acquiring related targets from upstream countries with higher institutional 
distance. Thus, the “liability of foreignness” can act as an effective risk mitigation scenario 
for related acquisitions, as is also shown in Figure 2.   
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------ Insert Figure 2 here ------ 
 
Finally, the results in column 5 (model ID x CD) support that bidders experience 
systematic risk declines when the targets are from upstream countries (β9 = -0.041, p<0.1), in 
support of H9. However, it appears that, for downstream targets, no combination of cultural 
and institutional distance distinctly influences post-acquisition risk, as we can also see from 
the interaction plots in Figure 3. Therefore, H8 is not supported. It can be argued that 
downstream institutions have more volatile business environments, higher customer risks, 
and political uncertainties, which firms from upstream countries are not always equipped to 
address (Kwok & Reeb, 2000). Since the “liability of foreignness” coming from downstream 
institutions cannot be mitigated by “double-layered acculturation”, firms may be better off 
engaging alternative internal mechanisms, such as the ones suggested by the governance 
literature, i.e., contingent payouts (Reuer et al., 2004). For all the estimated models in Table 
3, we also report mean VIFs. Since the mean VIFs do not exceed 2 in any of the models, we 
are confident that collinearity is not an issue.  
 
------ Insert Figure 3 here ------ 
 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
In Table 4, we illustrate the results from six sets of robustness checks.  
First, we use an alternative measure of institutional distance. Instead of the six 
dimensions from the World Governance Indicators we employ scores from the Fraser 
Institute’s World Economic Freedom Index (Aybar & Ficici, 2009; North, 1990; Zhou et al., 
2016). The index is a scalar variable ranging from 1 (low level of institutional development) 
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to 10 (high level of institutional development). For each deal in our sample, we calculate the 
difference in the scores for the target’s and the acquirer’s country as EFI distance. The results 
are quite robust (columns 1-3) and while support for H1 is weak, the key risk mitigation 
hypotheses (H5, H6, H8, and H9) are supported.  
Second, we use Altman Z-scores (Altman, 1968) as an alternative approach to cross-
border acquirer risk. Altman’s Z-score – widely used as a risk measure across finance and 
accounting – indicates a firm’s likelihood of bankruptcy (Agarwal & Taffler, 2007; Reynolds 
& Francis, 2000) and is estimated as 
  (3) 
where  X1 = Working Capital / Total Assets 
X2 = Retained Earnings / Total Assets 
X3 = Earnings before Interest and Taxes / Total Assets 
X4 = Market Value of Equity/Book Value of Total Debt 
X5 = Sales / Total Assets 
For each acquirer in our sample, we first calculate Z-scores one year prior to the 
announcement (Y-1) and one year after the announcement (Y+1), and then employ the 
difference between these scores ΔZ (Y-1,Y+1) as a new dependent variable in eq. 5. The mean 
(median) pre-acquisition Z-score is 4.013 (3.454) and the mean (median) change ΔZ (Y-1,Y+1) 
is -0.641 (-0.220). Since a lower Z-score suggests a higher likelihood of bankruptcy, the 
negative values of ΔZ (Y-1,Y+1) are perfectly in line with the general increases in ΔRisk, the 
change in the annualized systematic risk of the acquirer’s stock returns around the M&A 
announcement, as observed in Table 1. The coefficient estimates in columns 4-6 show that, 
while the main effects hypotheses (H1-H4) are not supported, coefficients , , , and 
are positive and significant (at least at 10%), suggesting that combinations of external 
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uncertainties can indeed moderate acquirers’ post-merger risk and reduce the likelihood of 
bankruptcy.  
The third set of robustness checks involves limiting our original sample to serial 
acquirers (i.e., acquirers that had completed at least one cross-border M&A already), to test 
the consistency of the empirical results for experienced acquirers. The results on the 
remaining 1,099 deals, shown under columns 7-9, offer support to H5, H6, and H9, 
suggesting that the integrated risk perspective generally holds for serial/experienced 
acquirers.  
Furthermore, in line with common practice in the M&A empirical literature, we 
exclude acquisitions by banks, insurance companies, and financial firms (Fama-French 
Industry Group 17: Banks, Insurance Companies, and Other Financials). Financials usually 
present increased leverage and particular risk characteristics (Fama & French, 1992), while 
they are also often subject to complex domestic and international regulatory backdrops. To 
ensure that such skewed financial fundamentals and external influences do not drive our 
results, we exclude 122 deals from our original sample. In columns 10-12, where we re-
estimate the full model from eq. 5, the majority of our hypotheses (H1, H5, H6, H7, and H9) 
are supported for the remaining 1,771 cross-border acquisitions in our sample. 
Finally, given the noteworthy concentration of cross-border targets in the UK (369) 
and Canada (298), we deemed it necessary to eliminate the possibility that the empirical 
results were driven by the dominance of these major target markets. As both these target 
countries present better institutional development than the US (positive institutional 
distance), there is a risk that H7 (IR  DU) and H9 (CD  IDU) in particular – which predict 
that risks from industry relatedness and cultural distance can be mitigated by upstream 
institutional distance – may no longer hold once these countries are excluded from the 
analysis. In columns 13-15, where we omit UK deals, although H1 and H7 are rejected, the 
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key hypotheses H5, H6, and H9 are still supported. These results suggest that, while in the 
absence of UK deals certain effects are weaker, the integrated risk approach remains an 
effective risk mitigation mechanism for all other target countries. In columns 16-18, we 
exclude the Canadian target deals and all results are qualitatively identical to those of the full 
sample in Table 3.  
 
------ Insert Table 4 here ------ 
 
DISCUSSION 
In this article, we address a gap in the IB literature by investigating the risk side of 
performance in a cross-border M&A context. We find that the systematic risk of US acquirers 
of foreign firms rises by about 18% on average during the post-acquisition period. Building 
on Miller (1992), we theorize and test the integrated risk management perspective in the 
domain of international M&As. Specifically, we exploit the simultaneous trade-offs among 
the risks of adverse selection and moral hazard, “double-layered acculturation”, and the 
“liability of foreignness”.  
Information asymmetry is a fundamental factor leading to the risk of adverse 
selection. Industry relatedness should decrease the risk of adverse selection, since the 
acquirer is familiar with the target’s business. Nonetheless, acquirers of related targets aim to 
achieve operational synergies, and are thus likely to attempt a large degree of consolidation. 
In an international context, high integration and implementation costs do not enable acquirers 
to realize operational synergy, especially when they become overconfident about their 
knowledge of the target and underestimate the challenges; the hubris, driven up by related 
acquisitions, therefore leads to risk increases for international acquirers. 
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In cross-border M&As, external factors, such as “double-layered acculturation” and 
the “liability of foreignness” further intensify acquirers’ risk by exacerbating and 
complicating the above internal factors of adverse selection and moral hazard. Nonetheless, 
our results support that external uncertainties, if configured suitably with internal ones, can 
mitigate acquirers’ risk in international M&As. With cultural awareness, acquirers can 
leverage high cultural distance to control industry-relatedness risks. After extending the 
upstream-downstream hypothesis of Kwok and Reeb (2000) to also account for the direction 
and magnitude of institutional distance, we find that firms do not necessarily expose 
themselves to more risk when they engage in acquisitions of downstream targets. However, 
institutional distance, as the key driver behind “liability of foreignness”, can mitigate 
acquirers’ risk from related acquisitions; thus, external uncertainty can mitigate acquirers’ 
risk stemming from internal factors. In addition, we show that –irrespective of target 
relatedness- upstream acquirers can further mitigate post acquisition risks by 
internationalizing into culturally distant countries. However, at least from a risk management 
perspective, we do not find benefits to downstream acquirers who internationalize into 
countries with both high cultural and institutional distance.   
Our results strengthen Miller’s (1992) integrated risk management perspective of IB 
and offer strong support for the notion that risk factors are interactive and cannot be managed 
alone. As we show, acquirers’ cross-border risk is an outcome of complementary and 
competing effects from such factors as adverse selection, moral hazard problems, cultural 
distance, and institutional distance. Therefore, our results complement existing research in IB 
(i.e. Lubatkin & O’Neill, 1987) and international finance (Ahern et al., 2015; Siegel et al., 
2011), which examine the influences of cultural and institutional distance in isolation of 
internal uncertainties.  
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 One limitation of our study is our use of a sample of US acquirers only. In our study, 
both cultural and institutional distance are measured against the US. This may limit the 
applicability of integrated risk management to US acquirers. Future research could examine 
the research questions in a global M&A context where acquirers are from multiple countries. 
Furthermore, although our sector-based proxy for industry relatedness is in line with the vast 
majority of the extant M&A empirical research, it may not completely capture the degree of 
organizational similarity in business traits and goals. To fully measure how acquirers and 
targets share strategic interdependence, redeploy resources, and combine at an operating 
level, we would need primary proprietary data from internal firm sources, which are not 
widely available. Further research might focus on developing reliable and precise proxies for 
operational similarity.  
 Our study opens several important avenues for future research. First, future research 
could investigate the application of integrated risk management in the context of other 
internationalization strategies (e.g., international joint ventures) or with other types of 
uncertainties (e.g., political risk). Miller (1992) suggests a variety of levels of uncertainties 
firms face when internationalizing, thus offering a very solid foundation for future studies. 
Second, we open a research stream focused on studying and quantifying strategic 
international risks. With the volatile global environment, as well as the drastic development 
of technology, risk mitigation plays an increasingly critical role in firms’ internationalization. 
Our measure of risk offers a sound empirical foundation for a more holistic examination of 
firms’ strategic international risks. Third, in this paper we focus on industry relatedness as the 
primary indicator of firm-level differences. Future research could examine the effects of the 
inner layer of “double-layered acculturation” (i.e. organizational-level cultural distance) to 
proxy for information asymmetry and moral hazard. Lastly, with the help of our theoretical 
extensions and empirical approach, future research may study the aptness of the integrated 
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risk management perspective on international M&A failure. In other words, does the trade-off 
among diverse risk factors reduce the probability of cross-border M&A failure? If so, how 
can international acquirers manage those risk factors? 
 
MANAGERIAL RELEVANCE 
Our study provides practical implications for international acquirers, who can mitigate their 
overall risk by integrating various risk factors. To leverage their exposure to uncertainties 
such as information asymmetry, moral hazard, and country-level differences, acquirers can 
utilize the trade-offs across their respective indicators: industry relatedness, cultural distance, 
and institutional distance. The simultaneous trade-offs across these indicators can provide 
acquirers with several scenarios for risk mitigation (see Table 5 for a taxonomy and 
illustrations): in Scenario I, when an acquirer wishes to target a firm in a similar line of 
business (i.e. High IR), overall post-acquisition risk can be reduced if the target is in a 
culturally distant country (High CD). In Scenario II, overall acquirer risk also decreases if a 
similar target is from a country with a very different institutional environment (High ID), 
particularly a better one. On the other hand, when merging with or taking over a firm in a 
different industry, overall risk is mitigated when the target is from a proximate cultural 
(Scenario III) or institutional (Scenario IV) background. Therefore, when an acquirer 
increases their exposure to information asymmetry and moral hazard – by acquiring a target 
from a different industry – they should decrease their exposure to the “liability of 
foreignness” and “double-layered acculturation” – by acquiring a target from a similar culture 
and institutional environment. Also, in Scenarios V and VI, when an acquirer wants to 
purchase a target from a foreign country in order to diversify their overall risk, it will be more 
rewarding to choose a target from a country which is both culturally and institutionally 
different. In other words, when aiming to diversify risk via overseas acquisitions, firms 
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should seek to increase their exposure to both cultural and institutional uncertainties, 
especially when they come from countries with better institutions.  
Of course, not all uncertainty exposures should necessarily be eliminated, since risk-
taking is an important element of the returns generation process in business. However, in 
scanning for cross-border M&A targets, the exploitation of trade-offs across the 
aforementioned uncertainties can provide acquirers with the advantage of risk mitigation 
before they have to invest in a sunk cost. In conclusion, we recommend that acquirers 
establish uncertainty exposure profiles for international M&As to help optimize their risk-
adjusted returns. 
 
------ Insert Table 5 here ------ 
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ESSAY II: 
MITIGATING THE RISK OF DEAL ABANDONMENT IN  
INTERNATIONAL MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS:  
THE ROLE OF OPERATIONAL RISK 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Why do firms abandon international mergers and acquisitions (M&As) despite of the 
substantial transaction cost? M&As may fall through because of the release of new and 
unexpected information after the public announcement. At country level, institutional theory 
helps us understand the exacerbated effect of formal and informal institutional constraints on 
information asymmetry between international acquires and targets. Building on institutional 
theory and information asymmetry argument, we apply the concept of operational risk as the 
contingency of country governance quality and the likelihood of deal withdrawal. Operational 
risk provides us a contemporary measure of organizational behavior under the various “rules 
of the game”. Using panel data method and a sample of 8,008 cross-border deals which 
includes 1,744 country pairs during 1996—2016, we find that acquiring country’s 
governance quality decreases the likelihood of deal withdrawal, and the risk mitigating effect 
is even stronger when the selling country has a strong governance mechanism as well, or 
when the acquiring country has high operational risk, or when the selling country has lower 
operational risk.  
 
Keywords: mergers and acquisitions; international; institutional environment; country 
governance; operational risk; deal abandonment  
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INTRODUCTION 
International mergers and acquisitions (M&As), as a popular mode of entry, provide 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) from either developed or emerging markets an important 
means to obtain complementary resources and capabilities, and to become more 
internationally competitive. However, more than 40% of international M&As fail either 
before or after the deal is completed (Mukherji, Dibrell, & Francis, 2013). In the pre-
completion stage, studies have shown that around 20% of the M&A announcements end up 
being withdrawn (Bates & Lemmon, 2003; Holl & Kyriazis, 1996). Deal withdrawal or deal 
abandonment incurs a large amount of costs including upfront costs in target selection and 
professional services (Bainbridge, 1990), costs of revealing private information (Officer, 
2003), opportunity costs (Bainbridge, 1990), the cost of breaching the contract (e.g., 
termination fees) and reputational losses (He & Zhang, 2018). In this article, we focus on 
explaining the reasons an international M&A gets abandoned in the pre-completion stage 
through traditional and contemporary country-level factors.  
Literature on post-acquisition performance is abundant (see review studies Haleblian 
et al., 2009; Martynova & Renneboog, 2008; Shimizu et al., 2004; Tuch & O’Sullivan, 2007). 
However, we know little about the likelihood of deal completion. Most of these studies 
examining the likelihood of deal closing focus on domestic M&As. The finance, accounting, 
and strategy scholars study a number of deal-level, firm-level, and country-level factors 
influencing the deal completion. At deal level, scholars have studied the impact of method of 
payment (Luypaert & De Maeseneire, 2015), deal hostility (Ngo & Susnjara, 2016), 
termination fee (Officer, 2003). At firm level, we have investigated such factors as 
acquisition experience (Muehlfeld, Rao Sahib, & Van Witteloostuijn, 2012), target firm 
accounting quality (Marquardt & Zur, 2014), interfirm status differentials (Shen, Tang, & 
Chen, 2014), board composition (Brickley, Coles, & Terry, 1994), state ownership of the 
- 54 - 
 
acquirers (Li, Xia, & Lin, 2017), and geographic distance (Chakrabarti & Mitchell, 2016). In 
cross-border M&As, we have been focusing on the impact of institutional distance or 
institutional development on deal completion (Dikova, Rao Sahib, & Van Witteloostuijn, 
2010; He & Zhang, 2018; Kim & Song, 2017; Zhou, Xie, & Wang, 2016).  
Drawing on information asymmetry argument, we extend institutional theory by 
connecting the “rules of the game” (North, 1990) of a country with contemporary 
organizational behaviors, operational risk. Operational risk is defined as “the losses resulting 
from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events” 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision [BCBS], 2004). It is measured from firms’ 
operational loss events  due to one or a combination of such reasons as employee errors, 
system failures, technology malfunction,  and internal fraud etc. Under three pillars of the 
regulatory, cognitive, and normative, a strong country governance system provides the firms 
a business environment with less transaction costs and uncertainty, and more knowledge 
sharing and information flow (Scott, 1995). Institutional theory offers us the environmental 
explanations on how MNEs perform in their internationalization process (Dikova et al., 2010; 
Kostova & Dacin, 2008). However, both formal institutional constraints (such as regulations, 
rules, and laws) and informal institutional constraints (such as shared values, conventions, 
and codes of conduct) play parts of the incomplete and imperfect information between 
acquirers and targets in international M&As.  
 Information asymmetry is the main culprit of deal abandonment. The acquirer could 
not have a full picture of the target’s firm information, preferences, and incentives before the 
public announcement. A deal withdrawal usually occurs because of the release of unexpected 
information after the announcement (Davidson III, Rosentein, & Sundaram, 2002; Hotchkiss, 
Qian, & Song, 2005). The reasons for the revealing of new information could be (1) there is a 
misunderstanding of the information shared; (2) unanticipated regulatory changes; (3) the 
- 55 - 
 
acquirer made mistakes or did not evaluate the target’s information as fully and precisely as 
the acquirer should; (4) the target firm intentionally hid or fabricated its information before 
the announcement in order to sell or sell at a high premium (Akerlof, 1970; Anagnostopoulou 
& Tsekrekos, 2015; Reuer, 2005). While institutional theory provides us the environmental 
explanations on reason one and two because organizations are “purposive entities designed 
by their creators to maximize wealth, income, or other objectives defined by the opportunities 
afforded by the institutional structure of the society” (North, 1990: 73), operational risk helps 
us dive into the behavioral aspects of information asymmetry regarding the imperfect 
information on what checklist the acquirer should evaluate (e.g., reason three) and what the 
target firm has done in the past (e.g., reason four).   
Using a sample of 8,008 cross-border M&As which includes 1,744 country pairs 
(target nation and acquirer nation) during 1996 to 2016, we find that the better the acquiring 
(i.e., acquirer’s) country’s governance quality is, the lower the likelihood of the deal 
abandonment. Furthermore, when the selling (i.e., target’s) country’s governance quality is 
also high, the acquiring country’s governance quality decreases even more of the likelihood 
of the deal abandonment. When the target governance (i.e., selling country’s governance 
quality) is low, the deal is more likely to withdraw despite of the level of the acquirer 
governance (i.e., acquiring country’s governance quality). Instead of examining the effect of 
institutional environment through institutional distances as an approach of differences, we 
precisely investigate the individual effect of acquirer country’s and target country’s 
institutional development, and we find more methodological reliable and practitioner friendly 
risk mitigation scenarios (Edwards, 2001). Additionally, the level of acquiring or selling 
country’s operational risk has different moderating effect on the acquirer governance as well. 
When the acquirer is from a country with strong governance mechanisms as well as high 
operational risk, the acquirer is less likely to abandon the deal with the foreign target. The 
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acquirer transferred its learning from its or others’ operational loss events to acquisitions and 
is more prepared and cautious in target selection and evaluation. However, in comparison, 
when the target is from a country with high operational risk, the acquiring country’s 
governance quality would not have a as strong effect on mitigating the deal closing risk. A 
target from high operational risk environment tends to fabricate its firm information, have 
reputational losses which triggers a negative market reaction to the M&A announcement, and 
thus diminishing the risk mitigating effect of acquiring country’s governance quality.  
Our study provides two contributions. First, we extend the scope and effect of 
institutional theory in firm internationalization strategy by cooperating the role of another 
contemporary country-level factor, operational risk. Institutional theory has provided us the 
environmental explanations through countries’ regulative, normative, and cognitive pillars in 
international business activities (North 1990; Scott, 1995). Institutional distance, as the key 
driver of “liability of foreignness” (Eden & Miller, 2004), offers rich and meaningful insights 
on the performance and strategy making of firms’ internationalization. Although 
organizations are assumed to modify “in the direction of increasing compatibility with 
environmental characteristics” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p.149), organizations and 
employees are subjective and “act on their own perceptions and act in unpredictable as well 
as predictable ways” (Astley & Van De Ven, 1983). By applying the concept of operational 
risk, we combine the “rules of the game” and organizational actions, enriching the 
institutional theory with a behavioral aspect or a measured outcome of enforcement. 
Operational risk is a contemporary measure of organizational behavior and country-level 
variations, which further helps the institutional theory to identify the co-evolutionary and 
dynamic effect between MNEs activities and governance development.    
Second, we disentangle the institutional distance by examining the direct and 
interaction effect between acquiring country’s and selling country’s governance quality on 
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the likelihood of international deal completion, which is a more mythological reliable and 
practitioner friendly approach. The approach of using difference scores (i.e., institutional 
distance) produces a lower reliability than either of the two component measures (Edwards, 
2001). Moreover, the distance approach does not have a clear managerial implication as in 
how big of an institutional distance is high or small and which country minus which. In this 
article, we provide the simple direct effect of acquiring country’s governance quality on the 
likelihood of deal completion, with either selling country’s governance quality in presence or 
absence, and, if in presence, the score range from World Governance Indicator (WGI) to 
mitigate the deal closing risk.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we discuss the 
theoretical framework and put forward testable hypotheses. Then, we present our empirical 
data and methodology. The fourth section illustrates the results and the fifth provides 
robustness checks to support our empirical results. The last section concludes with the 
discussion of our theoretical and managerial contributions, limitations, and the future 
research directions that we implied.   
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
Information Asymmetry in International M&As 
An M&A process, before the deal completion, has two stages called private and public 
takeover process (Boone & Mulherin, 2007). During the private takeover process, the bidder 
sets its own search criteria, receives private information from the seller (target) that it is 
interested in buying, evaluates the seller, and thus makes the initial offer/announcement 
(Dikova et al., 2010). After the public announcement, the public takeover process is 
exhaustive and usually takes several months to complete. The two firms continue to receive 
new information as the negotiation and due diligence extend (Hotchkiss, Qian, & Song, 
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2017). The release of new information demands a renegotiation and repricing between two 
firms. When the two firms cannot agree on the final price by the due date and leave both 
parties dissatisfied, the deal gets abandoned (Davidson III, Rosenstein, & Sundaram, 2002; 
Kim & Song, 2017). Thus, any unexpected information released during public takeover 
process can be detrimental for the deal closing (Mitchell & Pulvino, 2001).   
Information asymmetry is the very first factor determining the likelihood of deal 
success (Akerlof, 1970; Kim & Song, 2017). The reasons for the release or identification of 
new information after rather than before the public announcement can be summarized into 
three. First, the acquirer and/or the target have difficulties accessing to the accurate 
evaluations because of the institutional distance, underdeveloped institutional systems, or 
institutional voids (Khanna & Palepu, 2000a, b; Kim & Song, 2017; Ragozzino & Reuer, 
2011). Second, the acquirer did not have a comprehensive checklist while evaluating the 
target during the private takeover process due to managers’ hubris or lack of knowledge in 
M&A process. After the announcement, the acquirers often hire professional advisors to do 
thorough due diligence, which can identify new and unexpected information about the target 
company. Third, the seller/target intentionally hides or fabricates its firm information in order 
to sell the company at a high premium to the bidder/acquirer (Anagnostopoulou & Tsekrekos, 
2015; Reuer, 2005). While institutional theory helps us understand the first reason for 
information asymmetry between two firms, operational risk provides us new lens revealing 
the second and third reason.  
According to North’s (1990) political economy theory, country governance (i.e., rules 
of the game) serves the business activities with less uncertainty and transaction costs. Both 
the formal and informal institutional constraints vary across countries. While international 
M&As face substantial regulatory scrutiny and transactional complexity, strong institutional 
governance mechanisms from at least one party of the cross-border deal help with the 
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takeover process. Well-developed institutional environment protects the investment and 
shareholders, creates a transparent platform for the firms to share information, and therefore 
has low information asymmetry with other countries. Scholars find that institutional distance 
between two parties have negative effect on deal completion (Dikova et al., 2010; He & 
Zhang, 2018; Lim & Lee, 2017; Zhou et al., 2016). Despite that country governance quality 
increases information sharing and facilitates the process of deal completion, the explanatory 
effect is contingent on the degree of enforcement of “rules of the game”. “Rules of the game” 
provide the accessibility to the information, while the players’ actions are the realized 
information learning activities. In this article, we investigate the players’ actions through their 
operational loss events, which could help us understand more with the reasons for the 
revealing of new, unexpected information.  
 
The Definition and Literature Review of Operational Risk  
Operational risk is the risk of (operational) losses from the failure of people, process, systems 
and external factors. The term “operational risk” was born in 1990s. The tipping point for 
‘operational risk’ to get interests from practitioners and researchers is when Barings was 
brought down by Nick Lesson. Basel Committee classified operational risk into the following 
event types: (1) internal fraud, (2) external fraud, (3) employment practices and workplace 
safety, (4) clients, products and business practices, (5) damage to physical assets, (6) business 
disruption and system failures, (7) execution, delivery and process management (please see 
Table 6 for detailed definitions and examples). Some examples of operational loss events 
include technology failure, improper business practices, employment discrimination, 
employee errors etc. 
 
--------Insert Table 6 here-------- 
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Based on BCBS’s classification, Moosa and Li (2013) categorize operational risk 
under four headings: people risk, technology risk, process risk, and external risk. People risk 
arises from human error, employee misdeeds, and inadequate employee development and 
recruitment. Thus, people risk, defined as the major source of operational losses, is highly 
associated with corporate governance, corruption, ethical standards, internal controls within 
firms and management style. Process risk results from inefficiency or ineffectiveness in 
value-driving processes (i.e., sales and marketing, product development and customer 
support) and value-supporting processes (i.e., human resources and legal matters). System (or 
technology) risk arises from the system breakdown, data quality and poor project 
management, which depends on the state of technology. External risk is caused by 
macroeconomic and socioeconomic events as well as the actions of external parties (e.g., 
external fraud). Thus, external risk is determined by the economic fluctuation, regulatory 
change, and environmental standards. The classification from Moosa and Li (2013) extends 
the operational risk concept from banking industry to all other industries.  
In finance and banking literature, scholars study the determinants, consequences, and 
modeling of operational risk. They demonstrate that operational loss events do not only cause 
company a fortune by the loss amount, but also impact stock market reaction and generate 
reputational losses (Cummins, Lewis, & Wei, 2006; Karpoff & Lott, 1993; Perry & De 
Fontnouvelle, 2005). Cummins et al. (2006) find that the decline in market value after the 
operational loss announcement significantly exceeds the operational loss amount. Operational 
risk thus has a spillover effect. In order to mitigate operational risk, finance scholars have 
proposed various quantification methods using operational loss events data: extreme value 
theory, dependent risk processes, operational Value at Risk, and aggregation measures 
(Chavez-Demoulin, Embrechts, & Hofert, 2016; Chavez-Demoulin, Embrechts, & 
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Nešlehová, 2006; Cruz, 2002). Furthermore, corporate governance is found to be the most 
impactful determinant of the quality of internal control as well as operational risk (Chernobai, 
Jorion, & Yu, 2011).  
Companies in all industries and countries nowadays are suffering from operational 
loss events. With the development of technology, the growth of e-commerce, large-scale 
M&As, and increased outsourcing, operational risk becomes a business concern for all 
industries in every country (Alexander, 2003). Moosa (2007) also suggests that organizations 
expose themselves to operational risk more with increasing dependence on technology, 
intense competition, and globalization. After conducting the cross-country comparison, Cope, 
Piche, and Walter (2012) find that countries share different operational loss event types in 
dominance because of the country difference in governance quality and GDP per capita. 
Moosa and Li (2013) argue that the frequency and severity of operational loss events are 
significantly related to country-level factors. 
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Acquirer’s Country Governance  
According to institutional theory, institutions that comprise the rules of a society or “humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990). “Rules of the game” vary 
across nations. Scholars find that the better quality of the acquirer’s country governance is, 
the higher chance of deal completion (Ellis et al., 2017; Lim & Lee, 2017; Zhou, Xie, & 
Wang, 2016). With strong governance mechanisms to control for the managerial discretion, 
managers are less likely to act on acquisitions without exhaustive appraisal processes. With 
the absence of strong governance quality, acquirers’ managers are more likely to make hubris 
acquisition decisions under which the managers make mistakes in selecting and evaluating 
target firms (Seth, Song, & Pettit, 2002). After the announcement, if the professional 
- 62 - 
 
services’ due-diligence finds out new information, the deal gets abandoned. In other words, 
acquirers from better institutional environment have more discretion in targets selection, 
evaluation, pricing, and due diligence process, which minimizes the possibility of new and 
unexpected information coming up after the public announcement, and thus improving the 
chance of deal completion.  
Institutional environment helps reduce the information asymmetry between acquirers 
and targets (Dikova et al., 2010; Kim & Song, 2017). Institutions serve the firms with 
reducing the uncertainty and transaction costs by enforcing rules and regulations (North, 
1990). Less developed institutions do not only create higher enforcement and measurement 
costs, but also greater amount of information asymmetry (Akerlof, 1970). Further, better 
country governance means that firms can have access to sufficient contracting devices that 
are not available with poorer governance (Ellis et al., 2017), which facilitates the public 
takeover process and helps overcome risks of incomplete contracting (Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1979). In addition, finance and law literature find that firms in better country 
governance have more access to funding (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 
1998), which is essential for an international M&A to complete after necessary re-
negotiation. Many international deals failed to complete due to the premium pricing during 
public takeover process. Access to funding helps acquirers to pay the target at a re-negotiated 
and new price that is higher than the public announcement price. Therefore, we propose that 
acquirers’ country governance decreases the likelihood of deal withdrawal.  
 
H1. The better the Acquirer’s Country Governance, the lower the likelihood of Deal 
Withdrawal  
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Acquirer’s and Target’s Country Governance  
When the acquirers are from well-developed institutions, the international M&As would be 
more likely to complete if the targets also have strong governance mechanisms. Scholars find 
that high institutional distance decreases the likelihood of deal completion (Dikova et al., 
2010; He & Zhang, 2018; Lim & Lee, 2017; Zhou et al., 2016). Zhou et al. (2016) especially 
find that, for emerging markets’ multinational corporations (EMNCs), institutional distance 
decreases the likelihood of deal completion more when the EMNCs are being purchased by 
buyers from developed economies but less when the EMNCs are purchasing targets from 
developed economies. The institutional quality of the host or target country has a positive 
effect on the likelihood of deal completion and the deal performance (Aybar & Ficici, 2009; 
Gubbi et al., 2010; Zhang, Zhou, & Ebbers, 2011). When the targets are from less developed 
institutions, businesses may be conducted based on vague and personalized interpretations 
rather than the structured and standardized legislations and regulations in more developed 
institutions (Henisz & Zelner, 2010). The poorly defined business environment will create 
misunderstandings and misinterpretations for the acquirers that are from developed 
institutions during the negotiation and due diligence process and the acquirers will 
consequently be more likely to withdraw from the deal. 
More institutionally developed economies are more likely to provide protections for 
investments, share tangible and intangible knowledge (Berry, 2006), and less costly 
information (Khana & Palepu, 2000a, b). Specifically, at the private and public takeover 
processes, target firms from more developed institutions are more transparent and qualified 
with their accounting and finance information. The quality of targeting firms’ accounting 
significantly increases the likelihood of deal completion (Marquardt & Zur, 2014). The 
acquirers will have less information asymmetry with the target, which means acquirers will 
be less likely to find out unexpected information about the target firm after the public 
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announcement. With weak governance mechanisms, the corporate disclosure system may be 
underdeveloped, which limits the pre-due diligence scope and thus generates biased 
evaluations (Kim & Song, 2017). In addition, weak institutional environment often entails 
more unpredictability in regulatory and legal systems. When the targets are from less 
developed institutions, it is more likely for acquirers to encounter unexpected changes (e.g., 
unusual policy changes by the target country government) after the public announcement 
(Zhou et al., 2016). Therefore, when the quality of acquirers’ country governance is high but 
that of targets’ is not, there would be more information asymmetry and learning obstacles 
between two parties, and thus a higher probability of deal withdrawal.   
 
H2. The relationship between Acquirer’s Country Governance and Deal Withdrawal 
is stronger when the Target’s Country Governance is higher rather than lower.  
 
Acquirer’s Country Governance and Acquirer’s Operational Risk 
The M&A deal gets abandoned after public announcement usually because of the new and 
unexpected information released. One reason for the revealing of new information is that 
acquirer did not do an exhaustive evaluation of the target before making the offer because of 
the acquirer’s lack of experience. Another reason is that the deal is not a well-proposed one 
because of managerialism (acquirer’s managers did not carefully select the target with 
shareholders’ interest in mind) or hubris (acquirer’s managers are overconfident). With a 
strong country governance mechanism, the acquirer tends to have more managerial 
discretion, which decreases the chance of “bad lemon” selection (Akerlof, 1970), thus 
increasing the likelihood of deal completion. Moreover, the likelihood will be even more 
elevated when the acquirer country’s operational risk is higher rather than lower.  
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When the acquiring country’s operational risk is higher, meaning many firms located 
in the country have severely realized operational losses from events such as internal or 
external fraud, employee errors, product deficiencies, and accounting churnings etc. The 
business environment of high operational risk prepares the acquirer with more experience in 
risk management, employee training, and operational execution, which in turn helps the 
acquirer develop a more comprehensive checklist for its target selection and evaluation. 
Caterpillar, U.S. heavy-equipment behemoth, acquired ERA Mining Machinery Ltd, a 
Chinese coal-mine company, for $677 million in 2012. The deal was perceived as an easy-
money. Ironically, the “easy-money” part was exactly the problem leading the deal to a 
failure: “due diligence oversights on Caterpillar’s part and alleged deliberate, multi-year, 
coordinated accounting misconduct” (CB Insights, 2016). When the acquirers from countries 
with strong governance and high operational risk, the acquirers tend to have more 
competitive capabilities in strict target selection and assessment, thus increasing the 
likelihood of deal completion.  
 
H3. The relationship between Acquirer’s Country Governance and Deal Withdrawal 
is stronger when the Acquirer’s Operational Risk is higher rather than lower.  
 
 Acquirer’s Country Governance and Target’s Operational Risk 
“Rules of the game” serve the firms and people with well-defined boxes and arrows. Scott 
(1995) defines three pillars of the institutional framework—regulatory, cognitive, and 
normative, which includes rules and social values. Organizations are modified to be complied 
and compatible with these institutional coercive, mimetic, and normative pressures 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). When an acquirer purchases a target from a different institution, 
acquirers could learn about the three-pillar pressures and has a rough perception about the 
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target firm’s organizational structure, principles, and characteristics because of the 
isomorphism (Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). However, the 
system-structural view (organizational behavior is seen to be shaped by a series of 
impersonal mechanisms that act as external constraints on actors) does not fully predict that 
all employees would behave in a conformity and coherence manner. According to action 
theory, employees or individuals act on their own perceptions and behave in unpredictable as 
well as predictable fashions (Astley & Van De Ven, 1983). Thus, the acquirer could not have 
full knowledge of the personnel action or employee behavior within the target firm. 
Operational risk is a helpful measure for that.  
“The definition of operational risk tells us that a major source of operational risk is 
people risk—the risk of incurring losses because of the failure of people in the sense of 
having criminal tendencies or because they are incompetent” (Li & Moosa, 2015). When the 
targets’ operational risk is high, the employees are more likely to fail to meet obligations to 
clients or product designs, more likely to make mistakes in practices or task deliveries, and 
more likely to commit frauds and violations even with acquirer’s strong governance 
mechanisms. In addition, under high operational risk, firms may have fabricated their 
financial and accounting information in order to sell at a higher price. The information hidden 
or fabricated can be some operational losses from employment practices, system or process 
errors etc.  During the public takeover process, acquirers usually execute an even more 
thorough on-site due diligence review, which could potentially reveal more unexpected 
information about the target firm if the targeted country has high operational risk. Moreover, 
operational risk leads to high reputational loss (Cummins et al., 2006; Karpoff & Lott, 1993; 
Perry & De Fontnouvelle, 2005). When the targets are from countries with low reputation in 
doing business in, the deal announcement will have negative market reactions which puts 
pressure on two parties and impedes the deal completion process. Therefore, we propose that 
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when the target is from a country with high operational risk, the risk mitigating effect of 
acquirer’s country governance on deal abandonment will be weakened.   
 
H4. The relationship between Acquirer’s Country Governance and Deal Withdrawal 
is stronger when the Target’s Operational Risk is lower rather than higher.  
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The Sample of Cross-Border M&As and Operational Loss Events 
We collected cross-border M&A deals data on international acquirers and targets from 
Thomson EIKON Deals (formerly Thomson One - SDC). Our original data included all 
announced deals (completed and withdrawn) during the period 1995-2017, where the acquirer 
or the target was from any country and the deal must be international (i.e., the acquirer’s 
country is different from the target’s country). The size of the deal had to exceed $1 million. 
Additionally, we collected the data of global operational loss events from SAS software. The 
original dataset covers 34,780 operational loss events that occurred from 1900 to early 2017 
in 141 countries. The data includes such variables as the name of the firm that experienced 
the operational loss, the parent firm, loss amount, the country where the loss occurred, the 
country where the firm has its headquarters, the event risk level and category, key dates of the 
loss event, etc. The screening and integrating procedure resulted in a sample of 8,008 
observations which includes 1,744 country pairs (target nation and acquirer nation) and years 
from 1996 to 2016 for which we were able to collect data on all of the necessary variables.  
 
Variables and Model Specification 
We measure our dependent variable, Deal Withdrawal, at country level. For each acquirer 
country and target country, we calculated the Withdrawal Ratio as the ratio of number of 
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deals withdrawn in a year to the number of total deals announced in that year. Thus, for each 
pair of acquirer nation and target nation, there is a different withdrawn ratio for each year. 
Our independent variables include the acquirer country’s and the target country’s operational 
loss severity (Acquirer OPR and Target OPR), acquirer’s and target’s country governance 
(Acquirer Governance and Target Governance). A country’s average operational loss 
severity is measured as the ratio of its total severity in a year to its frequency of operational 
loss events occurred in that year (Li & Moosa, 2015). We take the logarithm of the average 
operational loss severity as our measure. Operational loss frequency is the number of 
operational loss events happened in that country in a year while the total operational loss 
severity is the total loss amount of all operational loss events occurred in that country in that 
year. In addition, Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi (2011) measure country governance quality 
using World Governance Indicators (published by the World Bank) on control of corruption, 
government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law, and voice and 
accountability. Following Ellis et al. (2017), we measure Acquirer Governance and Target 
Governance as the average score on all six dimensions for each acquirer nation and target 
nation.  
 In addition, even though the panel data method is supposed to consider the 
unobserved heterogeneity by the method itself, we controlled for two other country-level 
effects such as acquirer’s and target’s economy sizes (i.e., annual GDP) from the World Bank 
(Acquirer GDP and Target GDP), and acquirer’s and target’s cultural values (Acquirer 
Cultural Values and Target Cultural Values) according to Hofstede’s dimensions (Hofstede, 
2001).   
 Then we specify our analysis model at country level with acquirer country’s and 
target country’s governance quality and average operational loss severity for each year. Thus, 
our model is characterized to be analyzed via panel data method with the varying observation 
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as each country-pair (target nation and acquirer nation) and with the variant time as year. 
Panel data method allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity, and thus to get 
consistent estimates. It further enables us to study the dynamics of the relationship between 
country governance quality, long-lasting operational risk and international M&As’ closing 
risk. Specifically, we use the following model to analyze our panel data.   
 
Withdrawal Ratio it = β0 + β1 (Acquirer GDP) + β2 (Target GDP) +  
         β3 (Acquirer Cultural Values) +  
         β4 (Target Cultural Values) +  
           β5 (Acquirer Governance) it+ β6 (Target Governance) it +  
         β7 (Acquirer OPR) it + β8 (Target OPR) it +  
        β9 (Acquirer Governance * Target Governance) it + 
                β10 (Acquirer Governance * Acquirer OPR) it +  
          β11 (Acquirer Governance * Target OPR) it + αi + λt + εit      (1) 
where, i indicates every country pair during year t (t = 1996, 1997, …, 2016). αi is 
unobserved country effect, λt is unobserved time effect and εit is the idiosyncratic error.  
 
Panel data method includes the fixed effect model, random effect model, and 
population-averaged model. Fixed effect method allows the unobserved heterogeneity to be 
correlated arbitrarily with the independent variables in the model while random effect method 
assumes that the unobserved country effect (αi) is purely random (Wooldridge, 2010). 
Differing from the fixed and random effect methods, population-averaged model estimates 
the coefficient on averaging across the whole population rather than for the typical individual 
or group subject (i.e., country pair). Based on the nature of our research questions and data, 
the international deals occurred within one country pair (e.g., United States and China) might 
be correlated, thus violating the independence assumptions of the traditional regression 
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models (Hubbard et al., 2010). Population-averaged model, using the generalized estimating 
equations, estimates the effect by averaging the country-pair specific model across all country 
pairs. Furthermore, population-averaged model does not fully specify the distribution of the 
population while the cluster-specific model (i.e., fixed and/or random effect models) does 
require a fully, jointly, and correctly specified distribution (Neuhaus, 1992; Neuhaus, 
Kalbfleisch, & Hauck, 1991). Given the proved robustness and usefulness (Hubbard, et al., 
2010), we used population-averaged model to analyze our panel data and address our 
research questions.  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 7 shows the distribution of the sample by various groups. Panel A presents the sample 
distribution across acquirer nations while panel B shows the sample distribution by target 
nations. Over years of 1996 to 2016, the top five acquiring nations are the United States (US, 
total 6,720 outbound deals), United Kingdom (total 4,216 outbound deals), Canada (total 
2,967 outbound deals), Hong Kong (total 2,677 outbound deals), and Japan (total 1,532 
outbound deals). In the meantime, the top five targeted nations are the United States (total 
5,774 inbound deals), China (total 3,216 inbound deals), United Kingdom (total 2,673 
inbound deals), Canada (total 2,207 inbound deals), and Australia (total 2,111 inbound deals). 
As the table shows, highly withdrawn countries are not necessarily those most acquiring or 
targeted countries. Thus, we calculated the ratio of withdrawal as the dependent variable 
which takes into account the deal volume. One outstanding note to point out is that the United 
States has much less operational risk severity comparing to other countries such as Germany, 
Spain, and Italy etc. Panel C presents the sample distribution by year. Year 2007 has the most 
deals announcements as 3,173 in total) while year 1996 has the least as 678 in total. 
Meanwhile, year 2016 has the highest withdrawal ratio as 29.39% while year 1998 has the 
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lowest as 12.48%. Panel D lists the top twenty pairs of target nation and acquirer nation. Our 
sample has the most international M&As initiated between country pairs such as the US and 
Canada, the US and UK, the US and Australia. Among the top twenty country pairs, most 
withdrawals occurred between mainland China and Hong Kong, and China (as target nation) 
and Singapore (as acquirer nation). However, the most popular country pairs for international 
M&As are not necessarily the most failed at the pre-completion stage, which will be shown 
clearly combining with the simple statistics.     
 
-------Insert Table 7 here------- 
 
Table 8 reports the descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations among all variables. 
The table shows that none of the pairwise correlations is very high, which means the existing 
probability of multicollinearity issue is presumably low. Furthermore, the pairwise 
correlations tell us that all four independent variables have negative correlations with the 
Withdrawn Ratio (even Target OPR’s correlation is insignificant but negative). It is 
interesting to see that Target Governance has a relatively higher negative correlation with the 
Withdrawal Ratio (-0.0771***) than the Acquirer Governance does (-0.0563***). Thus, 
better governance quality from both acquirer and target is seemingly more important to close 
the international M&A deal than the institutional distance between acquirer and target 
country governance. The positive correlations among Acquirer Governance and Target 
Governance (0.0304***), Acquirer OPR and Target OPR (0.0116), Target Governance and 
Acquirer OPR (0.0407***) simply and partially prove the co-evolution among countries 
through internationalization (Cantwell, Dunning, & Lundan, 2010) and the portability of 
acquirer’s governance and principles (Bris et al., 2008; Ellis et al., 2017). In addition, we 
reckon that our dependent variable, Withdrawal Ratio, has a relatively small mean and many 
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zeros, which does not provide as an ideal level of variance for our analysis as in other studies 
like Dikova et al. (2010) and He and Zhang (2018). However, we calculated our Withdrawal 
Ratio at country and also year level in comparison with other studies using aggregated 
measures of all years.  
 
-------Insert Table 8 here------- 
 
RESULTS 
The results of the population-averaged panel data model are presented in Table 9. Unlike 
many studies, we do not provide a separate model of only main effects of independent 
variables. It is inappropriate and biased estimating and concluding the unconditional (main) 
effect in a separate model if the interaction terms are significant in another model (Brambor, 
Clark, & Golder, 2006; Carte & Russell, 2003; Dawson, 2014). Thus, we test our main 
effects and moderation effects together in our one model presented in Table 9.  It is 
interesting to see that neither of the acquirer’s country GDP (β1 = 0, p > 0.1)) nor the target’s 
country GDP (β2 = 0, p > 0.1) has a significant effect on the country-pair’s pre-deal failure 
rate. While the acquirer’s national culture has no significant effect (β3 = -0.0005, p > 0.1), the 
target’s national culture has a negative effect on the closing risk (β4 = -0.0011, p < 0.01). 
When other variables (i.e., Target Governance, Acquirer OPR, and Target OPR) are at zero, 
Acquirer Governance decreases the deal’s Withdrawn Ratio significantly (β5 = -0.0204, p < 
0.01). Thus, our hypothesis 1 is supported. Target Governance also decreases the Withdrawn 
Ratio significantly (β6 = -0.0281, p < 0.01) if other conditions are absent. Acquirer’s 
operational risk severity decreases the pre-deal failure rate significantly (β7 = -0.0107, p < 
0.010), and the target’s operational risk severity does not have a direct or significant marginal 
effect on the closing risk (β8 = -0.0034, p > 0.1) when other conditions are absent. Simply 
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from the coefficients of interaction terms in Table 9, we can see that the interactions between 
Acquirer Governance and Target Governance (β9 = -0.0205, p < 0.01), Acquirer Governance 
and Acquirer OPR (β10 = -0.0072, p < 0.05), and interactions between Acquirer Governance 
and Target OPR (β11 = 0.0072, p < 0.05) are significant. However, we cannot conclude with 
full confidence that our hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 are supported. Established studies have shown 
that the coefficients of interaction terms do not tell us the full and precise story of the 
moderating effects (Kinsley, Noordewier, & Vanden Bergh, 2017; Spiller, Fitzsimons, 
Lynch, & McClelland, 2013). Following the recommendations from these studies, we 
conducted a series of comprehensive tests for the moderating effects shown in Figure 4A—
6B. 
 
-------Insert Table 9 here------- 
  
The results in Table 9 tells us that Acquirer Governance decreases Withdrawn Ratio 
when other conditions are absent (β5 = -0.0204, p < 0.01, which is impossible in real 
practices) and even decreases Withdrawal Ratio more when Target Governance is present ( 
β9 = -0.0205, p < 0.01; -0. 0204-0. 0205= -0.0409). In order to avoid the issue of overstating 
the moderating effect, we tested the marginal effect of Acquirer Governance at various values 
of Target Governance (Kingsley et al., 2017). Figure 4A plots the marginal effect along with 
the 95% confidence bands over the relevant values of the moderating variable  Target 
Governance, which shows that Acquirer Governance has a statistically significant and 
negative effect on the Withdrawn Ratio over most of the sample values of Target Governance 
(from roughly -0.6 to 1) rather than all of the sample values. Figure 4B further vividly 
demonstrates the slope difference when Target Governance is low vs. high. When Target 
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Governance is low, Acquirer Governance increases the Withdrawn Ratio while only 
decreases when Target Governance is high.  
 
--------Insert Figure 4A and 4B here-------- 
  
Table 9 shows that Acquirer Governance decreases Withdrawal Ratio more when 
Acquirer OPR is present (β10 = -0.0072, p < 0.05; -0. 0204- 0. 0072= -0.0276). Again, we plot 
the marginal effect over the relevant values of the Acquirer OPR in Figure 5A and present 
that Acquirer Governance decreases Withdrawal Ratio only over some sample values of 
Acquirer OPR (from -1 to 4). Thus, we can conclude that, although the coefficient of the 
interaction between Acquirer Governance and Acquirer OPR is significant, Acquirer 
Governance only decreases the deals’ closing risk when the acquirer is from a country with 
high operational risk and actually increases the deals’ closing risk if the acquirer is from a 
country with low operational risk as also shown in Figure 5B interaction plot.  
 
--------Insert Figure 5A and 5B here-------- 
  
Acquirer Governance decreases the Withdrawal Ratio less when Target OPR is 
present (β11 = 0.0072, p < 0.05; -0. 0204 + 0. 0072= -0.0132) than absent (β5 = -0.0204, p < 
0.01) from Table 9. In other words, Target OPR weakens the risk mitigation effect of 
Acquirer Governance on the deal completion. However, not all levels of Target OPR will 
weaken the negative effect of Acquirer Governance. The conclusion from Table 9 would be 
plainly biased. Figure 6A proves that Acquirer Governance’s negative effect on Withdrawal 
Ratio will be smaller only when the Target OPR is lower than 1 versus higher than 1. Figure 
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6B further demonstrates that Acquirer Governance will only decrease the probability of deal 
withdrawal when Target OPR is low rather than high.  
 
--------Insert Figure 6A and 6B here-------- 
 
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
We mainly conducted two types of robustness checks. First, we tested the model with an 
alternative dependent variable with a different method. The alternative dependent variable 
used here is the deal-level withdrawal or completion as the dependent variable instead of the 
aggregated country-level withdrawn ratio. With this deal-level dependent variable, we chose 
to use the multilevel method (MLM) for the analysis. Second, we use an alternative measure 
of acquirer’s and target’s country governance. 
Using the deal-level withdrawal (Deal Withdrawal) as the dependent variable, we 
tested the model with the mixed multilevel method. The sample size remains the same, with 
8,008 observations within 1,744 country pairs. As Table 10 shows, the main effects are quite 
similar and even more significant. The only difference in the set of main effects is that the 
Acquirer Cultural Values shows a negative and significant effect on the Deal Withdrawal (β3 
= -0.0008, p < 0.1). The coefficients of the interaction terms Acquirer Governance and 
Target Governance (β9 = -0.0118, p > 0.1), and Acquirer Governance and Acquirer OPR (β10 
= -0.0066, p > 0.1) are insignificant in this mixed multilevel model, while the coefficient of 
the interaction term Acquirer Governance and Target OPR (β9 = 0.0075, p < 0.05) is still 
positive and significant. Again, we plotted the marginal effects to show a more 
comprehensive picture of the interaction effects in Figure 7, 8, & 9. Figures 7—9 present that 
H2, 3, & 4 are supported partially as the population-averaged model proves in previous 
section.  
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--------Insert Table 10, Figure 7, Figure 8, and Figure 9 here-------- 
 
Instead of the six dimensions from the World Governance Indicators we employ 
scores from the Fraser Institute’s World Economic Freedom Index (Aybar & Ficici, 2009; 
North, 1990; Zhou et al., 2016). The index (EFI) is a scalar variable ranging from 1 (low 
level of institutional development) to 10 (high level of institutional development). The 
resulting sample size using EFI become to 7,852 international deals within 1,709 country 
pairs from 2000 to 2016. The results in Table 11 are quite similar to our original results using 
the WGI. Using EFI, the direct effect of Acquirer Governance while other conditions are 
absent is not significant (β5 = -0.0095, p > 0.1), which is not practically useful or meaningful 
even if it is significant. The coefficients of the interaction terms between Acquirer 
Governance and Target Governance (β9 = -0.0103, p > 0.1), Acquirer Governance and 
Target OPR (β11 = 0.0050, p > 0.1) are insignificant in this model using EFI. Thus, we 
conducted more tests of marginal effects shown in Figure 10, 11, and 12. The marginal plots 
show that our H2, 3, & 4 are still supported partially at the right direction, but with a smaller 
range of values. After the two alternative tests, we are confident that our conclusions and 
findings are robust and consistent.  
 
--------Insert Table 11, Figure 10, Figure 11, and Figure 12 here-------- 
  
DISCUSSION 
The main culprit of deal abandonment is information asymmetry. In international M&As, the 
effect of information asymmetry is elevated because of “liability of foreignness” (i.e., 
institutional distance and other country-level differences). Through this article, we explore 
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the reasons of elevated information asymmetry in the lens of institutional environment (or, 
country governance quality) contingent on operational risk. We extend the information 
asymmetry argument by combining the institutional theory and finance’s contribution on 
operational risk. Institutional theory provides “rules of the game” while operational risk 
shows the players’ actions.  
Instead of testing the effect of institutional distance, we decompose and investigate 
the direct effect of acquiring country’s governance quality and its contingency on selling 
country’s governance quality. Scholars have focused and found that institutional distance 
decreases the likelihood of deal completion, however, we believe we should carefully check 
the effect of acquirer’s and target’s institutional environment separately rather than using 
difference approach. Our study finds that acquirer’s country governance quality increases the 
chance of deal completion without considering the target’s country governance quality. 
Furthermore, when the target’s country governance quality is high, the acquirer increases its 
likelihood of deal completion even more, and increases less when the target is from a less 
developed institution. This finding tells us that institutional distance does not always 
decreases the deal closing risk. Such scenario as high acquiring country governance and low 
target country governance (i.e., high institutional distance) would increase the deal closing 
risk.   
A firm’s country governance quality provides us the information on the local 
regulations and societal values that the firm is supposed to be following. However, firms are 
semi-autonomous, and they act on the basis of their own interpretations and incentives 
(Astley & Van De Ven, 1983). Thus, we investigate the players’ actions through their 
realized operational losses.  
First, we find that the deal is less likely to withdrawal when the acquirer is from a 
country characterized with better institutional environment and higher operational risk. The 
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acquirer country’s level of operational risk helps the acquirer learn to choose and evaluate the 
target better. When the acquirer is from a country not only with high governance quality but 
also high operational risk, it boosts its organizational learning from other firms’ or their 
operational loss events, which could be transferred to target selection and evaluation in 
acquisitions (Barkema & Schijven, 2008). Under such a scenario, the acquirer conducts a 
more thorough assessment on the target’s value, strategic compatibility, and accounting and 
finance information, which eventually helps them avoid bearing upfront costs and 
abandoning the deal.  
Second, we find that the deal is more likely to complete when the acquirer is under a 
strong governance system and the target’s country has low operational risk. If the target’s 
country has high operational risk, the target is more likely to hide or fabricate its negative 
information, creating high information asymmetry with the acquirer and obstacles for the 
acquirer to execute an accurate assessment during private takeover process. In addition, with 
a high operational risk business environment, the acquirer’s shareholders will be more likely 
to react negatively and push the acquirer to withdrawal the deal.  
Our study contributes to the information asymmetry theory by reckoning the effect of 
organizational behaviors (i.e., operational losses in our context) under various “rules of the 
game”. Institutional theory explains part of information asymmetry with respect of the 
differences in organizational principles, regulations, shared values, and societal norms. 
However, these rules do not fully predict individual behaviors or employment practices. By 
connecting to the realized activities, operational risk informs us the players’ actions under 
various “rules of the game”, which together helps the acquirers select and evaluate targets 
and make strategic decisions.  
One limitation of our study is that we focus on country-level factors rather than multi-
level sources of explanations on deal abandonment. Despite that the nature of our study 
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allows us to exploit the dynamics of international M&As with only country-level factors in a 
long-term window, we could comprehensively examine the influence of multi-level factors 
including the deal-level characteristics. In order to keep the data format and analysis as panel, 
we calculate our dependent variable, withdrawal ratio, at country level varying throughout 
years. Such measurement limits the variance to be explain at deal level, thus relatively 
preventing us from multi-level analysis. If we use the deal completion at the deal level, the 
dependent variable would not vary with time, at least would not vary at the same level as the 
country-level variables, which could shift the theoretical focus of our study.  
Our study opens several important avenues for future research by introducing 
operational risk from finance to international business. After decades of research in IB using 
cultural distance and institutional distance, we need another country-level variable which is 
explanatory, complementary, and dynamic. While cultural and institutional studies provide us 
the variance in regulations and shared values across countries (Hofstede, 1984; Kogut & 
Singh, 1988; North, 1990; Scott, 1995), operational risk measures the execution and delivery 
of firm strategies and organizational behaviors under rules of the society. Operational risk has 
gained more importance because of the development of technology, growth of e-commerce, 
large-scale M&As, and globalization. Along with the methodological advance and data 
boom, operational risk could provide us a better tool to quantify and predict country-level 
uncertainty along with other such country risk dimensions as political risk, financial risk, and 
economic risk (Howell, 2011), thus studying the corresponding firm-level strategy.  
We recommend two major future research directions building on operational risk. 
First, we can study the effect of operational risk on firm divestment decisions after 
international M&As. While deal withdrawal represents the M&A failure at pre-completion 
phase, divestiture could be an indicator of M&A failure after the completion. For post-
completion success, people-side integration and management are the key determinant (Shea 
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& Solomon, 2013). While cultural distance helps us understand the difference of people’s 
values and attitudes, operational risk measures people’s conducted behavior and actions. 
Thus, operational risk could explain part of the integration failure in international M&As.  
Second, operational loss events could help us understand the co-evolution between 
MNEs in the local country and local country’s governance development. As the argument of 
isomorphism gets challenged, the co-evolution theorists investigate how MNEs shift the local 
economy by enforcing their unique, foreign differences (Cantwell et al., 2010; Kostova et al., 
2008). Well-documented operational loss events could inform us the mistakes made by the 
local subsidiaries, which guides us to learn the influence of MNEs on the evolution of local 
country governance. In other words, through the lens of operational risk, we could observe 
how actors exercise judgement, adapt to the local rules, and transform the local system.   
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APPENDIX---TABLES 
 
 
 
Table 1: Sample Distribution 
 
Panel A: Sample Distribution by Target Nation 
Target Nation N Cultural 
Distance 
Institutional 
Distance 
Mean  
Δ Risk 
United Kingdom 369 3.22 0.16 0.16  *** 
Canada 298 3.76 0.31 0.24  *** 
Germany 152 7.82 0.18 0.17  *** 
France 109 14.02 -0.07 0.12  ** 
Australia 102 1.39 0.30 0.15  ** 
China 73 20.79 -1.81 0.23  ** 
Netherlands 62 12.44 0.41 0.12  * 
Israel 58 14.89 -0.73 0.24  ** 
India 52 14.34 -1.54 0.37  *** 
Sweden 45 15.85 0.47 0.08   
Switzerland 44 6.95 0.46 0.08   
Brazil 41 17.17 -1.30 0.07   
Japan 40 18.42 -0.18 0.15   
South Korea 39 22.05 -0.59 0.17  ** 
Spain 34 15.59 -0.33 0.13   
Italy 33 8.77 -0.66 0.24  ** 
Mexico 32 20.54 -1.39 0.18   
Norway 31 14.78 0.44 0.08   
Denmark 26 14.62 0.52 0.11   
Ireland-Rep 25 6.81 0.22 0.30  ** 
Other 228 16.72 -0.53 0.20 *** 
Total - Grand Mean 1,893 9.87 -0.12 0.18 *** 
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Panel B: Sample Distribution by Acquirer’s Industry 
Acquirer's Industry N % Related Target 
Mean  
Δ Risk 
Business Services 398 41.0% 0.20 *** 
Electronic Equipment 223 39.9% 0.09 *** 
Machinery 124 21.8% 0.21 *** 
Computers 104 9.6% 0.10 ** 
Medical Equipment 92 28.3% 0.02 
 Measuring and Control Equipment 88 12.5% 0.09 * 
Trading 87 11.5% 0.40 *** 
Pharmaceutical Products 71 50.7% 0.34 *** 
Chemicals 68 27.9% 0.10 
 Wholesale 49 22.4% 0.15 * 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 46 54.3% 0.17 * 
Electrical Equipment 43 14.0% 0.11 
 Retail 43 27.9% 0.12 
 Automobiles and Trucks 37 45.9% 0.26 ** 
Consumer Goods 34 32.4% 0.17 * 
Construction Materials 30 10.0% 0.26 ** 
Steel Works etc 28 21.4% 0.23 
 Communication 28 25.0% 0.39 *** 
Banking 26 0.0% 0.11 
 Precious Metals 25 64.0% 0.17 
 Others 249 37.8% 0.21 *** 
Total - Grand Mean 1,893 31.6% 0.18 *** 
 
 
 
Panel C: Sample Distribution by Year 
Year N Total Value ($mil) 
Median 
Value 
Mean  
Δ Risk 
2000 205 41,385.20 44.06 0.33 *** 
2002 124 18,111.58 30.00 0.35 *** 
2003 119 35,985.33 28.00 -0.02  
2004 163 21,816.90 38.80 0.01  
2005 171 33,420.07 32.67 0.02  
2006 165 32,895.01 48.41 0.06  
2007 164 46,841.33 27.15 0.38 *** 
2008 141 36,315.04 36.80 0.64 *** 
2009 88 24,018.80 35.04 -0.30 *** 
2010 122 31,255.21 71.43 0.03  
2011 140 43,816.64 57.95 0.61 *** 
2012 140 48,374.15 59.72 -0.15 *** 
2013 121 29,108.87 72.00 0.10 ** 
2014 30 6,048.86 73.92 0.29 *** 
Total - Grand Mean 1,893 449,392.99 41.70 0.18 *** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Panel A: Pairwise Correlations       
Model Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 
1. Δ Risk  1.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
2. Risk (T-120, T-1) -0.29*** 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
3. Δ VIX Index (T0, T120) 0.59*** -0.17*** 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
4. Δ AAII Sentiment (T0, T120) -0.11*** 0.03 -0.12*** 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . . . 
5. Merger Wave Dummy -0.04* -0.21*** 0.05** -0.02 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . . 
6. Recession Dummy 0.01 0.24*** 0.04* 0.10*** -0.38*** 1.00 . . . . . . . . . . 
7. % Paid in Cash 0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.04 0.01 -0.01 1.00 . . . . . . . . . 
8. Price/Book Ratio -0.05** -0.03 -0.08*** 0.04* 0.02 -0.04* 0.02 1.00 . . . . . . . . 
9. Total Debt/Total Assets 0.08*** -0.12*** 0.05** -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.11*** 0.12*** 1.00 . . . . . . . 
10. Relative Deal Size 0.04* 0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.18*** -0.10*** 0.04 1.00 . . . . . . 
11. % of Shares Acquired -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.06** -0.02 -0.01 -0.11*** 0.02 -0.18*** 0.13*** 1.00 . . . . . 
12. Prior Acquisition Experience 0.01 0.01 0.05** -0.01 0.00 0.10*** 0.08*** -0.08*** 0.26*** -0.12*** -0.20*** 1.00 . . . . 
13. Industry Relatedness 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.06*** -0.04* 0.05** -0.08*** 0.08*** -0.06*** 0.01 -0.01 -0.08*** 1.00 . . . 
14. Cultural Distance 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.10*** -0.08*** -0.25*** 0.15*** 0.04 1.00 . . 
15. Absolute Inst. Distance 0.02 -0.06** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.12*** -0.08*** -0.24*** 0.11*** 0.06** 0.59*** 1.00 . 
16. Upstream / Downstream -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.04* 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.15*** 0.11*** 0.26*** -0.14*** -0.02 -0.74*** -0.62*** 1.00 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics                 
Model Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 
Mean 0.180 0.228 0.331 -0.005 0.750 0.185 93.322 3.126 0.496 0.079 86.497 2.269 0.316 9.870 0.481 0.671 
5th Percentile -0.534 0.076 -8.391 -0.137 0.000 0.000 47.945 0.732 0.151 0.000 10.522 0.000 0.000 1.392 0.054 0.000 
Median 0.035 0.192 -0.575 -0.002 1.000 0.000 100.000 2.309 0.490 0.022 100.00 1.000 0.000 7.818 0.321 1.000 
95th Percentile 1.496 0.494 11.599 0.118 1.000 1.000 100.000 7.888 0.900 0.322 100.00 9.000 1.000 22.050 1.744 1.000 
SD 0.622 0.141 6.621 0.078 0.433 0.389 18.268 3.176 0.215 0.184 28.370 4.845 0.465 6.711 0.497 0.470 
N 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10       
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Table 3 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
DV: ΔRisk  (1) Base Model 
(2) 
Main Effects 
(3) 
IR  CD 
(4) 
IR  ID 
(5) 
CD  ID 
Constant 0.481*** 0.478*** 0.487*** 0.473*** 0.478*** 
 (7.582) (6.534) (6.990) (6.582) (6.522)    
Risk (T-120, T-1) -0.941*** -1.313*** -1.326*** -1.316*** -1.317*** 
 (-6.293) (-10.738) (-10.667) (-10.870) (-10.511)    
Δ VIX 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 
 (16.619) (16.313) (16.277) (16.157) (16.430)    
Δ Sentiment -0.357*** -0.295*** -0.288*** -0.297*** -0.293*** 
 (-3.970) (-3.339) (-3.146) (-3.240) (-3.308)    
Merger Wave Dummy -0.165*** . . . . 
 (-3.122)     
Recession Dummy 0.003 . . . . 
 (0.099)     
% Paid in Cash 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.430) (-0.387) (-0.516) (-0.357) (-0.345)    
Price/Book Ratio -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 (-0.190) (-0.427) (-0.595) (-0.571) (-0.324)    
Total Debt/Total Assets 0.071 0.020 0.022 0.020 0.017 
 (1.094) (0.359) (0.406) (0.353) (0.285)    
Relative Deal Size 0.188* 0.153 0.151 0.155 0.155 
 (1.788) (1.439) (1.432) (1.443) (1.459)    
% of Shares Acquired -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-1.053) (-0.450) (-0.427) (-0.362) (-0.358)    
Prior M&A Experience -0.003* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (-1.820) (0.598) (0.489) (0.576) (0.723)    
Industry Relatedness (IR)                    (H1) . 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.054*** 0.047**  
  (3.130) (3.233) (3.653) (2.830)    
Cultural Distance (CD)                       (H2) . -0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-0.468) (1.355) (-0.371) (-0.443)    
Inst. Distance Downstream (IDD)      (H3) . -0.008 -0.004 0.050 0.026 
  (-0.326) (-0.177) (1.568) (0.433)    
Inst. Distance Upstream (IDU)           (H4) . -0.046 -0.062 0.087 -0.066 
  (-0.649) (-0.841) (1.165) (-0.944)    
IR  CD                                            (H5) . . -0.010*** . . 
   (-4.295)   
IR  IDD                                           (H6) . . . -0.177*** . 
    (-2.998)  
IR  IDU                                           (H7) . . . -0.401** . 
    (-2.401)  
CD  IDD                                         (H8) . . . . -0.004 
     (-0.522)    
CD  IDU                                        (H9) . . . . -0.041*   
     (-2.050)    
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 1,893 
R-squared 0.408 0.452 0.454 0.455 0.453 
Adj. R-squared 0.404 0.447 0.449 0.450 0.448 
Mean VIF 1.116 1.174 1.230 1.269 1.801 
This table presents OLS regression results of the effects of Industry Relatedness (IR), Cultural Distance (CD), and Institutional 
Distance (ID) on Systematic Risk Changes (∆Risk) surrounding cross-border M&As. The t statistics based on robust standard 
errors clustered by industry are reported in brackets.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4 Robustness Tests 
 DV: ΔRisk; ID: EFI  DV: Δ Altman Z-Score  Sample: Serial acquirers 
 (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 
 IRCD IRID CDID  IRCD IRID CDID  IRCD IRID CDID 
Constant 0.092*** 0.090*** 0.096***  -1.269*** -1.188*** -1.256***  0.521*** 0.500*** 0.512*** IR (H1) 0.004 0.003 0.005  -0.092 -0.007 -0.094  0.031 0.028 0.020 CD (H2) 0.000 0.000 -0.001**  -0.004 0.001 -0.001  0.002 -0.001 -0.001 IDD (H3) 0.007 0.017** 0.020***  0.214* 0.021 -0.133  0.025 0.084** 0.027 IDU (H4) 0.012 0.014 -0.021  -0.535** -0.652* -0.545**  0.053 0.169 0.054 IRCD (H5) -0.002** . .  0.015* . .  -0.010*** . . IR IDD (H6) . -0.031*** .  . 0.511* .  . -0.215*** . IR IDU (H7) . -0.015 .  . 1.718*** .  . -0.304 . CD  IDD   (H8) . . -0.001**  . . 0.045*  . . 0.000 CD  IDU (H9) . . -0.009***  . . -0.022  . . -0.040*** Controls: Base Model            Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Observations 1,893 1,893 1,893  1,535 1,535 1,535  1,099 1,099 1,099 
Adj. R-squared 0.533 0.534 0.533  0.126 0.075 0.126  0.488 0.489 0.486 
Mean VIF 1.337 1.403 1.860   1.254 1.298 1.811   1.289 1.320 1.815 
 Sample: Excl. Financials  Sample: Excl. United Kingdom  Sample: Excl. Canada  (10) (11) (12)  (13) (14) (15)  (16) (17) (18) 
 IRCD IRID CDID  IRCD IRID CDID  IRCD IRID CDID 
Constant 0.475*** 0.459*** 0.463***  0.515*** 0.505*** 0.500***  0.454*** 0.439*** 0.450*** 
IR (H1) 0.055*** 0.057*** 0.051***  0.024 0.018 0.012  0.060*** 0.043*** 0.041** 
CD (H2) 0.004** 0.000 0.000  0.000 -0.002 -0.001  0.005* 0.001 0.000 
IDD (H3) -0.008 0.050 0.037  -0.001 0.053 0.021  -0.010 0.044 0.016 
IDU (H4) -0.071 0.056 -0.070  -0.124 -0.085 -0.052  -0.119 0.047 -0.091 
IRCD (H5) -0.011*** . .  -0.006** . .  -0.011*** . . 
IR IDD (H6) . -0.180** .  . -0.172*** .  . -0.179** . 
IR IDU (H7) . -0.325* .  . -0.087 .  . -0.462** . 
CD  IDD   (H8) . . -0.006  . . -0.003  . . -0.003 
CD  IDU (H9) . . -0.035*  . . -0.044**  . . -0.037* 
Controls: Base Model            
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,771 1,771 1,771  1,524 1,524 1,524  1,595 1,595 1,595 
Adj. R-squared 0.447 0.447 0.445  0.435 0.437 0.435  0.462 0.463 0.459 
Mean VIF 1.221 1.266 1.766   1.243 1.281 1.821   1.244 1.278 1.819 
This table presents OLS regression results of the effects of Industry Relatedness (IR), Cultural Distance (CD) and Downstream - Upstream Institutional Distance (IDD - IDU) on acquirer 
systematic risk changes around cross-border M&As. Robust standard errors (not reported) were clustered by industry. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5 Managerial Relevance of Empirical Results 
Panel A: Risk Implications of Empirical Results 
  Scenario Industry  
Relatedness (IR) 
Cultural  
Distance (CD) 
Institutional  
Distance (ID) 
Risk-Mitigating 
Scenarios 
#1 High High · 
#2 High · High 
#3 Low Low · 
#4 Low · Low 
#5 · High High 
#6 · Low Low 
Risk-Increasing 
Scenarios 
#7 High Low · 
#8 High · Low 
#9 Low High · 
#10 Low · High 
#11 · High Low 
#12 · Low High 
Panel B: Illustrative Example Scenarios 
Acquirer Industry: Pre-packaged Software 
Acquirer SIC: 7372 
Acquirer Nation: USA 
 Scenario Target Industry Target Nation SIC CD ID 
Risk-Mitigating 
Scenarios 
#1 Pre-packaged Software South Korea 7372 22.05 · 
#2 Pre-packaged Software China 7372 · -1.806 
#3 Computer Peripheral Equipment Canada 3577 3.76 · 
#4 Computer Peripheral Equipment Belgium 3577 · 0.029 
#5 · Indonesia · 21.84 -2.267 
#6 · United Kingdom · 3.22 0.158 
Risk-Increasing 
Scenarios 
#7 Pre-packaged Software Canada 7372 3.76 · 
#8 Pre-packaged Software Belgium 7372 · 0.029 
#9 Computer Peripheral Equipment South Korea 3577 22.05 · 
#10 Computer Peripheral Equipment China 3577 · -1.806 
#11 · Portugal · 22.90 -0.128 
#12 · South Africa · 6.92 -1.007 
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Table 6 Classification of Operational Loss Events According to the BCBS 
 
Event-Type 
Category 
(Level 1) 
Definition Categories (Level 2) Activity Examples (Level 3) Incident Examples from global data 
Internal 
Fraud 
Losses due to acts of fraud 
involving at least one 
internal party 
Unauthorized 
activity 
Conducting unauthorized 
transaction; 
Mismarking of position 
(intentional); 
In May 1998, Kia Motors Corp, a South Korean 
automobile manufacturing firm, reported that it 
had realized a loss of $37M due to 
embezzlement committed by its former 
chairman, Kim Sun-hong. Kim was accused of 
embezzling the funds between 1994 and 1997 
and using them to purchase Kia stocks in order 
to defend his managerial control. An 
investigation revealed that Kim had used 
company funds to bribe and lobby politicians in 
order to obtain bank loans to keep the company 
afloat. He was arrested in the course of a 
government inquiry conducted in the wake of 
the financial crisis. 
Theft and Fraud 
Theft / extortion / 
embezzlement/ robbery; 
Misappropriation of assets;  
Account take-over; 
Tax non-compliance; 
Bribes / kickback; 
Insider trading (not on firm’s 
account); 
External 
Fraud 
Losses due to acts of fraud 
involving a third party 
Theft and Fraud 
Theft / robbery; 
Forgery; 
Check kiting; 
In May 2006, Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and 
Banking Corp, a financial institution and 
subsidiary of Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group 
Inc, reported that it lost approximately $20.11M 
(2.24B JPY) in pension assets for corporate 
clients due to financial statement falsifications 
made by Seibu Railway Corp. 
Systems 
Security 
Hacking damage;  
Theft of information;  
- 103 - 
 
Employment 
Practices 
and 
Workplace 
Safety 
Losses arising from acts 
inconsistent with 
employment, health or 
safety laws or agreements, 
from payment of personal 
injury claims, or from 
diversity / discrimination 
events 
Employee 
Relations 
Compensation, benefit, 
termination issues;  
Organized labor activity; 
In August 2015, Target Corp, a US retail 
company, reported that it would pay $2.8M to 
the US Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) to settle allegations of 
hiring discrimination. The EEOC's investigation 
found that Target used three employment 
assessments during its hiring process that 
disproportionately eliminated applicants for 
exempt-level professional jobs based on race 
and sex. The assessments were not based on 
business necessity or sufficiently job-related, so 
they violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The 
company also required applicants to undergo an 
assessment by a psychologist during the hiring 
process. The Americans with Disabilities Act 
prohibited employers from requiring job 
applicants to submit to medical examinations 
before they were offered employment. 
Safe 
Environment 
General liability; 
Employee health and safety 
rules; 
Workers compensation; 
Diversity and 
Discrimination All discrimination types 
Clients, 
Products, 
and 
Business 
Practices  
Losses arising from an 
unintentional or negligent 
failure to meet a 
professional obligation to 
specific clines or from the 
nature or design of a 
product 
Suitability, 
Disclosure, and 
Fiduciary  
Fiduciary breaches / 
guidelines violations; 
Suitability / disclosure 
issues; 
Retail customer disclosure 
violations; 
Breach of privacy; 
Aggressive sales; 
Account churning; 
Misuse of confidential 
information; 
In April 2017, Hertz Corp, a US vehicle rental 
company and subsidiary of Hertz Global 
Holdings Inc, reported that two subsidiaries 
were fined $.93M (1.25M CAD) by Canada's 
Competition Bureau for misleading advertising. 
Beginning in 2009, Hertz Canada Ltd and 
Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group Canada Inc 
(Dollar Thrifty Canada) advertised car rental 
prices in Canada on their websites, mobile 
applications, emails, and promotional materials. 
However, those prices did not include certain 
mandatory fees that increased the advertised 
prices by up to 57 percent. Furthermore, the 
companies advertised discounts that could not 
be applied to the mandatory fees. As a result, 
the companies advertised prices that were not 
Improper 
Business or 
Market Practices 
Antitrust; 
Improper trade / market 
practices; 
Unlicensed activity; 
Product Flaws Product defects; 
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Model errors; actually available to consumers. The 
Competition Bureau also found that Hertz 
Canada and Dollar Thrifty Canada combined 
the fees with actual taxes and used descriptions 
that made it seem as if governments and 
authorized agencies required them to charge the 
fees. In reality, the companies used the fees to 
reduce their business expenses. 
Selection, 
Sponsorship, 
and Exposure 
Failure to investigate client 
per guidelines 
Advisory 
Activities 
Disputes over performance 
of advisory activities 
Damage to 
Physical 
Assets 
Losses arising from 
damage to physical assets 
from natural disaster or 
other events 
Disaster and 
other events  
Natural disaster loses; 
Human losses from external 
sources (terrorism or 
vandalism); 
Environmental degradation / 
hazardous material release; 
In September 2013, Shell Oil Co, a US oil 
company and subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell 
PLC, reported that it would pay $1.1M (1.16M 
EUR) to the US Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) for violations of the Clean Air 
Act. The EPA named two Shell Oil subsidiaries 
in its order, Shell Offshore Inc and Shell Gulf of 
Mexico Inc. The companies were accused of 
violating their Clean Air Act permits issued for 
oil and gas exploration drilling in the Chukchi 
and Beaufort Seas near the North Slope of 
Alaska. 
Business 
Disruption 
and System 
Failure 
Losses arising from 
disruption of business or 
system failure 
Systems 
Hardware;  
Software; 
Telecommunications; 
Utility outage / disruptions 
In August 2013, Amazon.com Inc, a US online 
retailer, reported that it lost an estimated 
$4.72M in sales due to an outage. For about 40 
minutes on August 19, 2013, users were unable 
to access the retailer's website to manage their 
accounts, search for products or pay for 
products. A review of the company's web 
history indicated that its Amazon Flexible 
Payments Service and Amazon Management 
Console had increased API error rates. 
 
- 105 - 
 
Table 7 Sample Distributions 
 
Panel A: Sample Distribution by Acquirer Nation 
Acquirer Nation # of Total Deals # of Withdrawn Deals Operational Risk Severity  ($ million) 
United States 6720 997 57.46 
United Kingdom 4216 563 1694.90 
Canada 2967 711 735.62 
Hong Kong 2677 921 3668.85 
Japan 1532 357 1118.97 
Singapore 1502 341 3185.84 
Australia 1418 325 406.46 
China 1272 427 1591.46 
France 1059 138 4599.71 
Germany 896 109 57411.69 
Netherlands 825 105 4338.72 
South Korea 598 192 971.76 
Switzerland 563 102 7526.03 
Sweden 540 65 2296.02 
Spain 517 51 9986.44 
Italy 515 76 8558.22 
India 503 112 796.93 
Ireland 449 47 561.43 
Malaysia 401 97 382.12 
Belgium 297 35 3240.24 
Others 3,205 558 86,949.91 
TOTAL 32,672 6,329 200,078.79 
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Panel B: Sample Distribution by Target Nation 
Target Nation # of Total Deals # of Withdrawn Deals Operational Risk Severity  ($ million) 
United States 5774 946 41.7081 
China 3216 1137 2449.347 
United Kingdom 2673 370 1052.385 
Canada 2207 413 545.0497 
Australia 2111 425 442.2594 
India 1224 239 1585.514 
Germany 1206 158 61027.23 
France 1137 108 4032.034 
Hong Kong 1134 379 3044.019 
South Korea 706 167 1069.199 
Singapore 656 167 2866.624 
Spain 639 60 7425.597 
Brazil 636 84 3703.808 
Italy 627 93 7598.494 
Japan 578 74 447.2743 
Netherlands 526 65 2203.309 
Indonesia 491 129 8238.501 
Russia 457 102 7193.611 
Sweden 368 36 1620.078 
Switzerland 349 62 4826.858 
Others 5,957 1,115 105,053 
TOTAL 32,672 6,329 226,466 
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Panel C: Sample Distribution by Year 
Year # of Total Deals 
# of Withdrawn 
Deals 
Withdrawal Ratio 
(%) 
Acquirer 
Operational Risk 
Severity  
($ million) 
Target 
Operational Risk 
Severity  
($ million) 
1996 678 92 13.57% 8338.83 8253.38 
1998 1594 199 12.48% 14851.23 15606.07 
2000 1848 296 16.02% 2973.46 4089.27 
2002 1040 186 17.88% 2082.84 5120.03 
2003 1226 219 17.86% 16565.16 18487.27 
2004 1737 340 19.57% 6909.41 11734.79 
2005 1936 316 16.32% 8211.88 7739.66 
2006 2390 488 20.42% 8678.77 12090.97 
2007 3173 608 19.16% 10016.72 20393.02 
2008 2504 514 20.53% 17327.22 13214.79 
2009 1745 389 22.29% 4794.95 11180.27 
2010 2145 429 20.00% 3086.13 3543.85 
2011 2123 423 19.92% 30026.19 18401.31 
2012 1890 382 20.21% 3038.76 4089.51 
2013 1543 314 20.35% 1917.02 1765.48 
2014 1754 311 17.73% 2326.77 3110.16 
2015 1665 329 19.76% 2998.49 3630.31 
2016 1681 494 29.39% 55934.97 64015.41 
TOTAL 32,672 6,329 19.08% (mean) 200,078.79 226,465.54 
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Panel D: Sample Distribution by Country Pairs (Target Nation and Acquirer Nation)  
Target Nation & Acquirer Nation 
# of 
Total 
Deals 
# of 
Withdrawn 
Deals 
Withdrawal 
Ratio  
(%) 
Acquirer 
Operational 
Risk 
Severity  
($ million) 
Target 
Operational 
Risk 
Severity  
($ million) 
United States & Canada 1728 350 20.25% 44.67 1.61 
China & Hong Kong 1659 659 39.72% 217.38 162.12 
Canada & United States 1279 209 16.34% 1.61 44.67 
United States & United Kingdom 1199 98 8.17% 59.00 1.61 
United Kingdom & United States 1082 108 9.98% 1.61 59.00 
Australia & United States 452 76 16.81% 1.61 28.65 
India & United States 440 72 16.36% 1.45 127.79 
China & United States 425 101 23.76% 1.61 162.12 
Hong Kong & China 394 146 37.06% 162.12 217.38 
Australia & United Kingdom 359 66 18.38% 59.00 28.65 
United States & Australia 358 55 15.36% 28.65 1.61 
United States & Japan 346 55 15.90% 55.24 1.61 
Germany & United States 322 26 8.07% 1.53 4005.88 
France & United States 306 21 6.86% 1.61 373.38 
China & Singapore 284 102 35.92% 245.87 132.77 
Germany & United Kingdom 270 39 14.44% 53.54 4005.88 
France & United Kingdom 259 26 10.04% 59.00 373.38 
United States & France 215 24 11.16% 373.38 1.61 
Brazil & United States 203 20 9.85% 1.30 265.31 
South Korea & United States 201 61 30.35% 1.61 103.62 
Other pairs 20,891 4,015 - 198,706.99 216,366.87 
TOTAL 32,672 6,329 17.98%(mean) 200,078.79 226,465.54 
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Table 8 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 
Panel A: Pairwise Correlations     
Model Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 
1. Withdrawal Ratio 1     
    
2. Acquirer GDP 0.0046 1        
3. Target GDP -0.0088 -0.0853*** 1       
4. Acquirer Cultural Values -0.0068 0.2499*** -0.025** 1      
5. Target Cultural Values -0.0435*** -0.0343*** 0.1994*** 0.0359*** 1     
6. Target Operational Risk -0.0177 0.0354*** -0.4009*** 0.0504*** -0.0586*** 1    
7. Acquirer Operational Risk -0.054*** -0.4698*** 0.0433** -0.1033*** 0.0496*** 0.0116 1   
8. Acquirer Country Governance -0.0563*** -0.0055 -0.0554*** -0.1595*** 0.0107 0.0689*** -0.0273** 1  
9. Target Country Governance -0.0771*** -0.0143 0.1258*** -0.0242** -0.0308*** -0.1172*** 0.0407*** 0.0304*** 1 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics 
    
Model Variables 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 
Mean 0.185 2,510,000 1,980,000 54.99 54.81 -0.07 -0.08 0.04 0.08 
5th Percentile 0 127,000 57,784.5 34.00 37.50 -3.40 -3.30 -1.52 -1.34 
50th Percentile 0 1,020,000 705,000 56.25 56.25 -0.10 -0.15 0.28 0.41 
95th Percentile 1 13,900,000 11,500,000 71.75 71.25 3.46 3.33 0.74 1.07 
Sd 0.315 3,940,000 3,500,000 10.64 10.72 1.83 1.78 0.70 0.85 
N 8,008 8,008 8,008 8,008 8,008 8,008 8,008 8,008 8,008 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1     
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Table 9 Population-Averaged Model Results 
 
DV: Withdrawal Ratio Estimates  
Constant 0.2755*** 
 (9.66) 
Acquirer GDP 0.0000 
 (-1.60) 
Target GDP 0.0000 
 (-0.23) 
Acquirer Cultural Values -0.0005 
 (-1.27) 
Target Cultural Values -0.0011*** 
 (-2.90) 
Acquirer Governance                                              (H1) -0.0204*** 
 (-3.41) 
Target Governance -0.0281*** 
 (-5.62) 
Acquirer OPR -0.0107*** 
 (-4.55) 
Target OPR -0.0034 
 (-1.49) 
Acquirer Governance * Target Governance             (H2) -0.0205*** 
 (-2.87) 
Acquirer Governance * Acquirer OPR                     (H3) -0.0072** 
 (-2.21) 
Acquirer Governance * Target OPR                         (H4) 0.0072** 
 (2.33) 
Observations 8,008 
Number of country-pairs 1,744 
This table presents population-averaged (generalized estimating equation) panel regression results of the 
effects of Acquirer operational risk (OPR), Target OPR, Acquirer Institutional Development, and Target 
Institutional Development on the country-pair (Target Nation and Acquirer Nation)’s withdrawn ratio per 
year from 1996 to 2016 surrounding cross-border M&As. The t statistics based on robust standard errors 
clustered by the country pair are reported in brackets.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10 Multilevel Method Results 
 
DV: Deal Withdrawal Estimates  
Constant 0.2677*** 
 (5.70) 
Acquirer GDP 0.0000 
 (-0.54) 
Target GDP 0.0000 
 (0.77) 
Acquirer Cultural Values -0.0008* 
 (-1.89) 
Target Cultural Values -0.0013*** 
 (-3.21) 
Acquirer Governance                                          (H1) -0.0207*** 
 (-2.94) 
Target Governance -0.0291*** 
 (-5.14) 
Acquirer OPR -0.0094*** 
 (-3.17) 
Target OPR -0.0014 
 (-0.51) 
Acquirer Governance * Target Governance         (H2) -0.0118 
 (-1.49) 
Acquirer Governance * Acquirer OPR                 (H3) -0.0066 
 (-1.60) 
Acquirer Governance * Target OPR                     (H4) 0.0075** 
 (2.03) 
Year Fixed Effects (1996-2016) Yes 
Observations 8,008 
Number of country-pairs 1,744 
This table presents multilevel regression results of the effects of country-level variables such as Acquirer 
operational risk (OPR), Target OPR, Acquirer Institutional Development, and Target Institutional 
Development on the deal-level dependent variable deal withdrawal from 1996 to 2016 surrounding cross-
border M&As. The t statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by the country pair are reported in 
brackets.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 11 Population-Averaged Model Results using EFI 
 
DV: Withdrawal Ratio Estimates  
Constant 0.2752*** 
 (8.73) 
Acquirer GDP 0.0000 
 (-1.23) 
Target GDP 0.0000 
 (-0.38) 
Acquirer Cultural Values -0.0005 
 (-1.26) 
Target Cultural Values -0.0011** 
 (-2.55) 
Acquirer Governance                                           (H1) -0.0095 
 (-1.40) 
Target Governance -0.0117** 
 (-1.98) 
Acquirer OPR -0.0105*** 
 (-4.19) 
Target OPR -0.0037 
 (-1.57) 
Acquirer Governance * Target Governance         (H2) -0.0103 
 (-1.23) 
Acquirer Governance * Acquirer OPR                (H3) -0.0065* 
 (-1.95) 
Acquirer Governance * Target OPR                    (H4) 0.0050 
 (1.49) 
Year Fixed Effects (2000-2016) Yes 
Observations 7,852 
Number of country-pairs 1,709 
This table presents population-averaged model results of the effects of country-level variables such as 
Acquirer operational risk (OPR), Target OPR, Acquirer Institutional Development, and Target 
Institutional Development on the country-level dependent variable withdrawn ratio from 2000 to 2016 
surrounding cross-border M&As. The t statistics based on robust standard errors clustered by the country 
pair are reported in brackets.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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APPENDIX--FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1 Interaction Effects of Industry Relatedness and Cultural Distance 
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Figure 2 Interaction Effects of Industry Relatedness and Institutional Distance 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Interaction Effects of Institutional Distance and Cultural Distance 
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Figure 4A Marginal Effect of Acquirer Governance at Target Governance 
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Figure 4B Interaction Plot of Acquirer Governance and Target Governance 
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Figure 5A Marginal Effect of Acquirer Governance at Acquirer OPR 
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Figure 5B Interaction Effect of Acquirer Governance and Acquirer OPR 
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Figure 6A Marginal Effect of Acquirer Governance at Target OPR 
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Figure 6B Interaction Effect of Acquirer Governance and Target OPR 
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Figure 7 Marginal Effect of Acquirer Governance at Target Governance Using MLM 
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Figure 8 Marginal Effect of Acquirer Governance at Acquirer OPR Using MLM 
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Figure 9 Marginal Effect of Acquirer Governance at Target OPR Using MLM 
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Figure 10 Marginal Effect of Acquirer Governance at Target Governance using EFI 
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Figure 11 Marginal Effect of Acquirer Governance at Acquirer OPR using EFI 
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Figure 12 Marginal Effect of Acquirer Governance at Target OPR using EFI 
 
